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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis offers a counterargument to the claims that Bolivian peasant farmers are 
acting in contradiction with their political support of food sovereignty by participating in 
a global quinoa economy. This research gives agency to the farmers by reframing the 
Bolivian quinoa story to show how farmers succeeded in overcoming “development” 
projects. My research is inspired by two brief periods of time I spent living in Bolivia 
volunteering with campesinos. This research offers insights into the unintended 
consequences producers experience when export of a regionally consumed food becomes 
a major economic development strategy to alleviate poverty. I take a historical 
perspective to analyze how a little known indigenous food from South America, quinoa, 
became a global commodity. My research is grounded in historical data that explains the 
necessity for farmers to seek new buyers for their crops. I problematize agricultural 
development programs by drawing upon critical development theoretical framework, 
which allows me to recognize farmers for the role they played in finding a new market 
for their product. I use a Global Value Chain lens to expose positive and negative effects 
on farmers of entering a global market. This thesis on the Bolivian quinoa economy 
serves as a case study on how community members need to be participants in 
“development” projects, how an unintended consequence of neoliberalism is the ability 
for peasants to use neoliberalism as a tool to resist against it and, cautions against 
focusing poverty alleviation only on market access.  
  
	iv	
CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................... vii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................. viii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ ix 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 The Significance of Quinoa ................................................................................. 4 
1.3 The Nutritional and Geographical Importance of Quinoa ................................. 5 
1.4 The Quinoa Debates ........................................................................................... 7 
1.5 Research Methodology ........................................................................................ 9 
1.6 Limitations ........................................................................................................ 10 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BOLIVIAN 
DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................................... 11 
2.1 Quinoa as Development .................................................................................... 11 
2.2 International Aid Policy’s Influence on the Decline of Quinoa ....................... 14  
2.3 The Rebirth of the Quinoa Economy ................................................................. 17 
2.3.1 1960s International Development Projects ................................................... 17 
2.3.2 1970s: Formation of Peasant Cooperatives .................................................. 18 
2.3.3 The 1980s: New Economic Reforms and New Markets ................................. 21 
2.3.4. International Technical Cooperation ........................................................... 23 
2.4 Globalization Via Supply Chain Development ................................................. 24 
2.5 Fair Trade as Development .............................................................................. 26 
2.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 34 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF A GROWING 
VALUE CHAIN .......................................................................................................... 37 
3.1 A Growing Quinoa Value Chain ..................................................................... 38 
3.2 Theoretical Lens: Global Value Chains .......................................................... 38 
3.3 Mapping the Value Chain ................................................................................ 39 
3.3.1 Producer Organizations: CECAOT and ANAPQUI .................................... 39 
3.3.2 The Role of Middlemen ................................................................................. 42 
3.4 Peasant Upgrading .......................................................................................... 44  
3.5 New Structures of Governance: The Demand for Organic ............................. 46 
3.6 The Entrance of Private Firms ........................................................................ 48  
3.7 A Divided Countryside: Contract Farming ..................................................... 51 
3.8 Fair Trade’s Supply Chain .............................................................................. 56 
3.9 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 59 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERALISM
 ....................................................................................................................................... 61 
4.1 The Progression of Indian Rebellions ........................................................... 61 
	v	
4.1.2 19th Century Migration ............................................................................... 63  
4.1.3 The Fight Against Exploitation: The 1952 Revolution ............................... 65  
4.1.4 Indians as Second-Class Citizens: the 1950s-70s ....................................... 66 
4.2 The Fight Against Globalization: The Rise of the Movement Toward Socialism67 
4.3 Neoliberalism and New Identities – The Neoliberal Indian Paradox ........... 68 
4.4 The Promotion of Indigenous Rights by NGOs ............................................. 70 
4.5 Politicizing Food: The Creation of Food Sovereignty ................................... 72   
4.6 Food Sovereignty in Bolivia .......................................................................... 75 
4.7 Exporting Quinoa, A Contradiction? ............................................................. 76   
4.8 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 78 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 80 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 84 
 
APPENDIX A  ............................................................................................................. 93 
 
APPENDIX B  ............................................................................................................. 94 
 
APPENDIX C .............................................................................................................. 95 
  
	vi	
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Figure 1: Association Value Chain Model 
Figure 2: Evolution of quinoa exports by producer organizations 
Figure 3: Income for Bolivian Quinoa Producers 
Figure 4: Economic Actors in the “Quinoa Real” value chain (southern Altiplano of Bolivia) 
Figure 5: Quinoa Cost Breakdown: Fair Trade Quinoa vs. Conventional  
 
  
	vii	
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ANAPQUI  Associación Nacional de Productores de Quinua (The National Association of 
Quinoa Producers) 
ATO  Alternative Trade Organization 
CECAOT  Central de Cooperativas Operación Tierra (Central of Farming Cooperatives 
“Operation Land”) 
CONAMAQ  Confederation of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyo  
IBCE   Bolivian Institute for Foreign Commerce 
IFAD   International Fund for Agricultural Development  
ITC   International Technical Cooperation Program  
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FLO   Fairtrade Labeling Organizations  
LVC  La Vía Campesina 
MAS   Movement Toward Socialism 
NTAE   Non-traditional Agricultural Export 
OECA  Organizaciones Economicas Campesina (Peasant Economic Organizations) 
PO   Producer Organization 
SAI    Servicio Agrícola Interaméricano (Inter-American agricultural Service) 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
UNHDI  United Nations Human Development Index 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
  
	viii	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to thank my family for their support throughout graduate school and their 
belief in me that one day I would complete this thesis. I would like to thank my husband, 
who never waivered in his support of me throughout my studies and this writing process. I 
would like to thank my Bolivian “family.” My host parents in Cochabamba who looked after 
me as if I was one of their daughters and the founders of the NGO where I volunteered. 
Freddy and Rosa allowed me to volunteer at their business. I thought I was providing a 
service to them, but the reality was that I learned far more than I could teach. They taught me 
the challenges and true meaning of community-led development. My experiences in Bolivia 
made a lasting impact on my personal development, my professional career and most 
importantly, a profound impact on my worldview.  
I would also like to thank all of the members of my committee: my advisor, Dr. 
Howard Rosing, for his patience, advice and insights throughout the thesis writing process; 
Dr. Larisa Kurtovic for her guidance in the thesis proposal process and Dr. Fernando 
DeMaoi, and Dr. McIntyre for their encouragement, suggestions and participation on my 
committee.   
 
	1	
 
CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Quinoa is known around the world by professional chefs, household cooks, and fast 
food retailers. It is sold as a standalone product and is promoted as a base ingredient. 
Originally known only to those who had served as its protectorate, the Inca’s and their 
ancestors, quinoa has broadened its reach from select Andean countries to the world. In 2010 
I lived in Cochabamba, Bolivia with a middle-class family while volunteering at a locally run 
NGO working with the local farmers. One evening, I shared a quinoa dish with my host 
mother that she had prepared for the two of us. For the past several weeks I had been living 
with this family yet I had never eaten one of the country’s primary traditional foods. 
Although my host mother grew up in a farming community eating quinoa as a staple food, it 
had been years since she had prepared it. Over the course of the meal she reminisced about 
eating quinoa dishes throughout her childhood. She expressed sadness about how she no 
longer ate it because her husband and children did not like the taste; moreover they 
considered it low class—a “peasant food.” The stigma her family placed on quinoa was a 
reflection on the discrimination against indigenous peoples in Bolivia. European and U.S. 
imperialist projects, colonial rule and food aid programs all promoted non-indigenous food 
products. However, around the turn of the twenty-first century, Bolivia’s “peasant food” 
increasingly gained popularity in foreign markets as a healthy food.  
When I returned to Bolivia in 2014, I once again sat at the kitchen table with my host 
family who relayed new quinoa stories. Over the course of the four years, quinoa had become 
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increasingly hard to find in the local markets as it transformed into a coveted global food 
commodity, a phenomena that lead to a significant shift in the perception of the crop in its 
native Bolivia. The family had recently attended an upper-class wedding and the first course 
was quinoa salad. Cold salad is atypical among the traditional Andean preparations. Cold 
quinoa was indicative of how the Bolivian upper class had caught on to quinoa’s external 
popularity with wealthy, health conscious Northern consumers; quinoa had become chic on 
both sides of the equator, yet I had read that it was disappearing from domestic marketplaces. 
While visiting the NGO where I once volunteered, I asked the founders if they noticed 
quinoa in the local markets. They commented that the local campesinos were complaining 
that quinoa was very expensive and hard to find. What struck me most during this visit was 
the increased presence of quinoa on “tourist menus” and a general difficulty in finding 
quinoa in its traditional setting. On one occasion, I walked through a local street market 
where I eventually found a vendor selling quinoa far in the back. Upon discovering the stand, 
I was surprised to find a man next me to paying for his purchase with a 100 Bolivian bill 
(although this amount is only about USD 7 it is a large amount for the average Bolivian). The 
day before I had walked into a supermarket and found quinoa in a matter of minutes. Indeed, 
it was easier to find quinoa on the grocery shelf than it was in its traditional home, the local 
market. No longer just a “peasant food,” Northern consumers had reshaped the popularity of 
quinoa for Bolivian society. Quinoa had come full circle, from the revered crop of indigenous 
people and the sacred food source of the Incan Empire, to surviving centuries of decline as a 
“peasant food,” under colonial rule to a symbol of modernity.  
The new quinoa economy had its positive and negatives. While Bolivian quinoa 
exporters expressed enthusiasm for selling their product abroad, the food was becoming 
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harder to find and harder to afford for the population that usually ate it. Meanwhile, multiple 
competing brands of quinoa were appearing in North American grocery stores. These three 
scenarios epitomized the challenge facing Bolivia as it increasingly exported an important 
local food source. Interestingly, finding external buyers was originally a grassroots project 
led by quinoa farmers as a means to generate a sustainable income following the failures of 
previous “development” projects. Their efforts caught the attention of development agencies 
such as USAID, World Bank, UNDP, and the European Economic Community (Healy 2001). 
With external funding for technology combined with the campesinos’ perseverance, the 
Bolivian quinoa economy entered global capitalism. Yet the success of the new Bolivian 
commodity was not without challenges. Power struggles among stakeholders within the 
commodity chain created new social problems and inequalities within Bolivian society.  
A project that was once meant to help one of the poorest sectors of Bolivian society, 
the expanded commodification of quinoa, instead produced negative effects on the 
environment, social problems and tensions in traditional farming communities, and its 
benefits were increasingly out of reach for the most marginalized population—the traditional 
small-scale producers. In the context of Bolivia’s tumultuous political history and the 
significant role indigenous campesinos played in that history, it seems contradictory to the 
interests of farmers that they would support export production of their age-old staple food. In 
contrast, this paper will illustrate how the project was quite characteristic of this agrarian 
community. In seeking to give agency to the quinoa farmers, I provide a historical outline of 
the Bolivian quinoa story; I show how what began as a community-led project born from the 
margins of society, morphed into peasant farmers as traders in a global commodity. This 
paper therefore offers a critique of employing export agriculture for economic development.  
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I seek to explain the consequences of such a strategy for a rural community whose livelihood 
becomes increasingly dependent on a buyer-driven value chain extending thousands of miles 
from the community. In sum, this thesis investigates the unanticipated positive and negative 
consequences of the Bolivian quinoa economy.  
 
1.2 The Significance of Quinoa 
At the time of writing this thesis in 2017, it has been three years since my last visit to 
Bolivia. The Bolivian quinoa boom ended due to an increase in global supply as other 
countries entered the marketplace. While exploring what this economic shift means for 
Bolivian farmers, the thesis illustrates how the quinoa economy is a microcosm of the 
growing trend of promoting cultivation and exports of indigenous foods as a development 
strategy to help subsistence farmers (Thrupp 1995, Brett 2010). As a case study in grassroots 
development, the thesis highlights how quinoa producers sought to expand exports to support 
grassroots economic growth projects, an effort resulting in unintended positive and negative 
consequences. Their efforts can be understood within the larger context of the food 
sovereignty movement with philosophical tenants (Desmarais 2008) codified in national 
legislation (Romero and Shahriari 2009) and of importance to local peasant movements 
(Cockburn 2013). The attention paid to quinoa in literature appears to have decreased post 
boom. Early literature focused on the feasibility of quinoa for the fair trade market (Laguna 
2003), the changing role of producer organizations (Ton & Bijman, 2006), the positive 
impact for farmers (Caceres, Carimentrand and Wilkinson 2007, Salcedo 2015), and the 
negative impact on farmers (Carimentrand and Ballet 2010). Yet little has been written since 
the quinoa boom ended. My goal is to contribute to the literature by looking back at how the 
quinoa economy developed through the actions of governments and policymakers, 
	5	
international aid agencies, and the farmers themselves. The thesis questions development’s 
strategy of poverty alleviation for rural farmers by connecting them to global commodity 
markets. By framing the quinoa export economy within the food sovereignty paradigm, I 
explain how the entrance into the global economy is not a contradiction, but rather a new 
form of resistance. This argument emerges within four chapters that explore: 1) quinoa’s 
significance and the debates surrounding the growing quinoa economy, 2) the trajectory of 
quinoa as a development project including, an assessment of fair trade as development, 3) 
unintended consequences of the quinoa economy through the lens of Global Value Chains 
and 4) the rise of indigenous political power and seemingly contradictory actions of the 
farmers, including their connection to the food sovereignty movement.  
 
1.3 The Nutritional and Geographical Importance of Quinoa 
Situating the Bolivian quinoa economy within its geographical and economic contexts 
allows for a broader understanding of the explosive international interest in exporting this 
nutritious crop and the internal desire in Bolivia for new international buyers. Understanding 
these contexts is essential for understanding the debate between those advocating for 
production of quinoa for local consumption versus as a global commodity crop. 
In Bolivia 45 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (CIA World Fact 
Book 2016). According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, in rural 
areas three out of four people live in poverty (IFAD) and on the United Nations Human 
Development Index Bolivia ranks 118th (UNHDI). Given the high indicators of poverty in 
Bolivia it is fascinating that this superfood is being produced for external consumption. 
Quinoa has become an important export crop for regional and the national economy. 
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According to a report released by the Bolivian Institute for Foreign Commerce quinoa 
exports from Bolivia reached USD 153 million in 2013 (IBCE 2013). Quinoa is a native crop 
to the Andes and it is very important to the region for its high nutritional and agronomic 
value that has allowed the survival of local populations located in geographically isolated and 
harsh regions to survive. It once held a prominent status in the Andean culture. Quinoa was 
so vital to the Incas that it was considered sacred. For example, in Quechua the word for 
quinoa means “Mother Grain” (National Research Council 1989, 149). The quinoa-growing 
regions include the northern and southern Altiplano of Bolivia and the highland valleys of 
Peru (Hellin and Higman 2001, 5). The region is characterized by little rainfall, very cold 
nights, and intense amount of sunlight. The main production area in the country is the 
Altiplano, especially the southern area, where ecological conditions make it impossible to 
grow other crops (Gandarillas et al. 2015, 352). Quinoa is tolerant to drought, freezing and 
salinity. It (Chenopodium quinoa) is not a grain rather it is a pseudo-cereal; it is the only 
plant food that contains all essential amino acids, is high in total dietary fiber, rich in 
vitamins, contains high levels of minerals (it stands out for its high content of, iron, calcium, 
magnesium and zinc) and is a complete source of high quality protein (PROIMPA 2011, 7-
12). Because of its nutritional value and ability to grow in harsh, nearly inhospitable 
climates, quinoa remains an important crop in three main regions of the Andes, all of which 
are located 3,200-4,200m above sea level.  
This paper focuses on the export of quinoa from the Southern Altiplano of Bolivia. This 
area is one of the driest in Bolivia – quinoa is the only commercially viable crop that can 
survive the harsh landscape (Gandarillas et al. 2015, 345). The Altiplano is where quinoa 
production has grown significantly and where “Quinoa Real” is grown for export. According 
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to Gandarillas et al., in this area alone there are more than twenty local varieties however, the 
most popular are “Real Blanca,” “Chaku,” “Pandela”, “Toledo” and “Phisanqalla.” When 
these varieties are grown outside the dry Altiplano in more humid areas they are prone to 
mildew attacks (2015, 356). Furthermore, the Altiplano is the region where the two oldest 
and largest peasant cooperatives are located, ANAPQUI and CECAOT, and from where the 
first quinoa crop outside of the Andes region was exported; as of 2013 it is where nearly 
100% of all Bolivia quinoa produced for export originates (IBCE 2013), and it is a political 
stronghold for anti-neoliberalism. All of these factors contribute to the complexities of the 
challenges faced in delivering quinoa to international buyers and expose the paradoxes with 
this group of farmers exporting a staple food.  
 
1.4 The Quinoa Debates 
The so-called “discovery” of quinoa by the Global North and its health and socially 
conscious consumers provokes controversy north and south of the equator over the effects 
that increased exportation is having on Bolivian quinoa farmers and local consumers. News 
outlets have primarily focused their research on the question of whether “to eat or not to eat 
quinoa” (Blythman 2013). This question boils the quinoa conundrum down to a simple “yes” 
or “no” answer thus, obscuring the complex dilemmas faced by quinoa farmers. There are 
inconclusive media reports about quinoa in Bolivia: some argue the economic benefits to 
farmers (Grover 2013); others recognize that the increased cost of quinoa is making 
procurement by local populations difficult (Friedman-Rudovsky 2012); still others argue that 
Bolivians are eating less quinoa because it is more prevalent in external markets (Romero 
and Shahriari 2011). Meanwhile, recently there has been backlash against the Bolivian 
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government for its unwillingness to share quinoa seeds. This criticism is based on the claims 
that quinoa has the potential to help meet one of the UN Millennium Development goals, to 
end world hunger, and therefore the Bolivian government and farmers should share 
knowledge of quinoa (Hamilton 2014).  
A number of scholars have been investigating the production of quinoa. Some have been 
warning of the environmental and social concerns that mechanization would bring to the 
region (Laguna 2003), while others have discussed the role fair trade is playing in quinoa 
producing communities (Carimentrand & Ballet 2010). Ofstehage (2010), for example, has 
focused on how local systems of agriculture, trade and reciprocity have remained intact 
despite this quinoa boom, pointing to the importance of the role of intermediaries in keeping 
these systems of domestic trade alive. Still, other scholars contend that in these times of 
transformation, traditional moral economies provide the means to navigate a hybrid quinoa 
economy (Walsh-Dilley 2013). Through their on the ground studies, these scholars offer 
significant contributions to the understanding of what is happening in specific communities 
in the southern Altiplano of Bolivia from the point of view of the farmer.  
The significant growth of the Bolivian quinoa economy, the quinoa boom, suffers from 
shallow interpretations of the outcomes of this boom on both large and small scale farmers, 
quinoa producing communities and migrant laborers. The literature pays little attention to the 
inequalities deepened when peasants enter a global commodity chain. As such it is not able to 
provide a critical analysis of the inequalities that result from rural communities’ participation 
in the global quinoa economy. Moreover, these arguments miss the historical context in 
which quinoa farmers themselves became the primary actors seeking funding to improve 
their crop for export. Scholars of the Latin American peasantry who have written 
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ethnographically on specific rural, quinoa-producing communities have contributed to 
understanding how these communities have avoided some of the negative consequences of 
the boom (Ofstehage 2010, Walsh-Dilley 2013). Previous writings, however, have failed to 
ask why the need to pursue export production existed in the first place. They do not 
recognize the consequences of the end goal of food as development—the commodification of 
a food source—observers fail to see how these kinds of “development” projects bring non-
Western economies more fully into the capitalist system and the complex consequences of 
this entrance. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 The idea for this research project was born during the three months I spent living in 
Bolivia in 2011when I first learned of quinoa, its newfound popularity outside of the region 
and witnessed poverty levels that made me question why this valuable crop was grown for 
export. In pursing a deeper and more critical understanding of the Bolivian quinoa economy 
in this thesis, I rely heavily on secondary data collected over the course of five years through 
online periodicals, journal articles, books, as well as previous academic research papers. 
Throughout this research period I conducted informal interviews with Bolivian researchers. I 
spoke with a former Peace Corp volunteer who, in 2006, was assigned to help farmers find 
new buyers. As well, I spoke with a researcher for Food First based in La Paz focusing her 
research on the effects of the quinoa boom on communities in the Southern Altiplano.  
Chapter one contains ethnographic data collected during a brief visit to Bolivia in 
2014. I conducted informal interviews with my former host family and NGO colleagues who 
helped me understand the present day implications of the increase of quinoa export. I 
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engaged in ethnographic research when visiting supermarkets, and markets where I collected 
information on the price of quinoa in different forms and in different locations. Artifacts 
from this trip include photographs of the quinoa-growing region, photographs from a tour of 
a cooperative processing plant, and academic books published in Bolivia. In chapter two I 
reply upon secondary literature to place the project to export quinoa into critical development 
studies. Chapter three analyzes the quinoa commodity chain through the Global Value Chain 
theory. The research method for chapter three includes the use of secondary data including 
global value chain literature, importers company websites, webinars, and fair trade academic 
studies. Ethnographic research was conducted through an informal interview with a manager 
at a quinoa cooperative, CECAOT and Fair Trade USA. Chapter four places the quinoa 
economy into a political context, specifically analyzing the farmers’ quest for new buyers 
through the lens of the food sovereignty movement. Again, the research method was the use 
of secondary research. 
 
1.6 Limitations 
 I was not able to return to Bolivia for another expended period of time to be able to 
conduct formal field research. This thesis is limited in its ability to provide a deeper dive into 
the conditions Bolivia quinoa farmers are experiencing, the prices they were and are 
currently being paid for quinoa or observe the social tensions in the region brought on by the 
quinoa boom. Because I was not able to spend a significant amount of time living in the 
Altiplano I was not able to conduct empirical research with farmers.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BOLIVIAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
2.1 Quinoa as Development 
 
A missing piece in the story of the Bolivian quinoa economy’s trajectory is the key role 
farmers played in bringing their product to a new international marketplace. This chapter 
provides historical background helping to explain why would Bolivia’s quinoa farmers 
sought buyers outside of the Andean region. This project formed as a bi-product of an 
existing internationally led development project. In his book, Multicultural Grassroots 
Development in the Andes, Kevin Healy (2001) tells the story of development in Bolivia 
through a series of grassroots development experiences, including quinoa. According to 
Healy quinoa as a development process is as an example of, “indigenization or revitalization 
of cultural traditions” (vii). For Andean development scholars, Andolina, Laurie, and 
Radcliffe, (2009) the region is a site of research on the confluence between development and 
culture. In this chapter I show how the creation of the international quinoa trade is an 
example of the influence of development policy on local economies and the influence of 
local culture on development. 
Based on the guidance of the US, Bolivia began to use food as a vehicle for economic 
development. The result was the decline in consumption and therefore production of quinoa 
was no longer a sustainable livelihood (Healy 2001). Framing quinoa as a development 
project illuminates how current societal and health problems stem from centuries of colonial 
policy, including agricultural policy designed by the U.S. Although framed as a recent 
concern (Romero and Shahriari 2011, Collyns 2013, Blythman 2013, Bertelli 2013), lack of 
access to quinoa and coinciding poor malnutrition rates is in fact a results of a decades long 
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economic policy, beginning in 1956, promoting import substitution (Healy 2001). 
Development projects, whether led by the state, NGOs or private organizations, such as fair 
trade certifiers, only focus on quinoa as a viable option for farmers to increase household 
income. In this chapter, I argue that quinoa production should be viewed as a development 
strategy for which it was not originally intended, that in the later years project aid agencies 
hoped it would become, and that eventually its success as an international commodity would 
produce. By viewing the trajectory of the quinoa economy under the lens of multiple 
development theories, we gain new perspective on the role and participation of the peasant 
farmers in the development of this economy and the resulting unintended consequences it 
that resulted. 
Similar to how the news articles frame the Bolivian quinoa economy as having 
positive or negative results (DePillis 2013, Verner 2013), outcomes of development projects 
have been framed as successful or unsuccessful. James Ferguson in, The Anti-Politics 
Machine (1990), introduces the notion that international aid projects do not have to be 
classified as “successful” or “failures” or “real development,” but rather as an intervention 
that alters the landscape. Ferguson describes international aid projects “as productive and 
having effects—they may not be the outcomes originally intended by the development 
planners but they most certainly made an impact and changed the landscape in ways that 
likely would not have been altered without this intervention.” In the history of Bolivia’s 
quinoa economy, Ferguson’s definition is applicable to the first phase that took place in the 
Altiplano, a project led by foreigners and that produced little value for the community. The 
unrelated project that sprang from the presence of aid workers, a tractor rental service, 
illustrates Ferguson’s view; aid workers made an impact but in ways that were not originally 
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intended. This chapter views the project to develop the Bolivian quinoa economy through 
Ferguson’s lens—an intervention that alters a landscape.  
The expansion of the quinoa economy spans the decades from the 1970s through 
present day. When looking at the progression of the export of quinoa parallels can be drawn 
to the various development theories: development projects as state-led projects primarily 
funded by outside donors working in collaboration with local government agencies (Healy 
2001, Escobar 2012, Ferguson 1990); efforts by the development community to provide more 
ownership (“participation”) by communities (Li 2007); and ethnically aware development 
(Andolina, Laurie, & Radcliffe 2009). The Bolivian State and NGO-led development projects 
largely ignored the inhabitants of the Altiplano in part because they viewed the region as 
unproductive and the terrain unsuitable for development. Although the Altiplano was 
overlooked, quinoa producers were victims of a larger agriculture development strategy and 
policy agenda that shaped projects throughout the country. This strategy would contribute to 
the eventual decline of the local quinoa economy. It was not until locals were handed control 
over failing NGO-run development projects that quinoa become the focus of a community 
improvement effort. What makes the quinoa case unique in this regard is that precisely 
because of the lack of attention to agrarian communities of quinoa producers, they became 
the main actors in promoting efforts to secure new international trade relations for their 
product. The following section provides background on how the process of finding new 
buyers began as grassroots efforts by a local community cooperative. I explain how once the 
project had proved successful, new actors entered into the quinoa business introducing large-
scale development projects and Bolivian government involvement. By looking back at how 
quinoa became a globally traded commodity, it becomes possible to understand why the 
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original intent of the quinoa producers was to find international buyers. It is then possible to 
see the parallel path quinoa followed to other agricultural development efforts that moved 
farming toward industrialized agriculture.  
 
2.2 International Aid Policy’s Influence on the Decline of Quinoa  
Once quinoa became popular outside of the Andes, several articles appeared claiming 
the increase in quinoa consumption by Northern consumers was negatively impacting 
producers. A frequently sited article published in The Guardian claimed, “the appetite of 
countries such as ours for this grain has pushed up prices to such an extent that poorer people 
in Peru and Bolivia, for whom it was once a nourishing staple food, can no longer afford to 
eat it” (Blythman 2013). What is missing from these articles is the fact that quinoa 
consumption had been in decline for decades; by the 1980s quinoa had significantly 
diminished. Centuries of intervention from outsiders, first the Spanish conquistadors and 
later international development agencies, deliberately implemented policies and practices to 
reduce the harvest of indigenous crops. The media articles fail to include the historical 
background on the policies that lead to the decline in the local demand for quinoa and as 
such, these articles fail to list how it came to be that the peasants led the movement to obtain 
new buyers.  
Framing the quinoa economy as “development” allows us to appreciate the struggles 
peasants overcame to bring their product to a new market. Arturo Escobar in, Encountering 
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (reprinted in 2012) looks at 
development as a historical construct. Describing it as something unnatural—it enables 
development to be seen as a space where poor countries are specified and intervened upon 
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(2012). Bolivia frequently has been “intervened upon.” The flow of US economic aid to 
Bolivia from 1940 for four decades resulted in led to one of the highest levels of aid per 
capita in Latin America (Healy 2001, 19). Consequently, as Escobar suggests, 
“development” is productive in the sense that people learn they are “not-developed” and can 
be further dominated by the “First World” (2012). Bolivians have been victims of this 
mentality since the time of colonialism and up through to United States imperialism, both of 
which had severe impacts to the indigenous food system.  
As a means to force the indigenous people to assimilate, the Spanish not only 
conquered the people of the Andes but also altered their food system during the colonial 
period, which lasted until the early 19th century; indigenous crops were deliberately repressed 
and replaced with European foods (Hellman and Higman 2001, 6). In the subsequent century, 
foreigners created policies and projects with similar goals. By the mid-twentieth century, the 
United States was exerting its power throughout Latin America and in the 1940s, Western 
development aid began to shape an anti-indigenous national development policy. Influenced 
by the US, Bolivia’s approach to economic development was based on two models, state 
capitalism and neoliberalism. Both of them limited indigenous development and further 
created an economic divide between the highland indigenous people and the rest of the 
country. Based on perceived progress of the U.S. agriculture model observed by Bolivian 
agricultural administrators during the 1930s, the Bolivian government began to believe the 
U.S. approach was the answer to their underdevelopment problems (Healy 2001, 16-17). 
American Merwin Bohan was the main architect of the Servicio Agrícola Interaméricano 
(SAI). He was influenced by neo-colonial attitudes from his elite Bolivian friends and found 
“both the native ‘world view’ and Aymara language to be detrimental to the country’s 
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immediate development prospects” (Healy 2001, 20). As such, SAI’s policies focused on 
introducing non-native plant species into Bolivia, a practice leading to devastating impacts 
on the landscape. 
The model of state capitalism began after the 1952 revolution. The emphasis of the 
economy policy was economic diversification and import substitution. One such program 
was initiated in the Atiplano. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) financed a program in the town of Potosí teaching farmers how to improve 
production of wheat. When it was time to sell the locally grown crop, farmers could not 
compete with the low cost wheat imported through U.S. food aid programs (Healy 2001, 
161). In the same highlands region, non-indigenous animals, such as sheep, were introduced 
leading to overgrazing and a severe degradation of topsoil and vegetation. Traditional 
grazing of llamas or production of crops was discouraged; the sale of llama meat was 
prohibited. As Healy notes, “an emergency relief program from the United States gradually 
evolved into a national structural dependency which complicated various aspects of nutrition, 
native resource, food preferences, and agricultural biodiversity over the next four decades” 
(2001, 29). By the mid-1970s, Bolivia had become the per capita world leader in food aid 
shipment from the U.S. By 1984 wheat-based products had grown to represent 75 percent of 
the calories consumed as a result of the U.S. food aid program that began in 1956 (Healy 
2001, 30). The importation of U.S. subsidized wheat severely altered the food system; 
imported crops substituted traditional crops such as quinoa. Between 1960 and 1984 
consumption of wheat-based products grew from 18 percent of the calories in the diet of 
urban consumers to 75 percent and 70 percent of the protein (Healy 2001, 30).  
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Escobar defines “development” as the, “growing will to transform drastically two-
thirds of the world in pursuit of the goal of material prosperity and economic progress” 
(2012, 4). To bring peasants “economic progress” Bolivian economic policy included import 
substitution aimed at eliminating agricultural imports such as sugar, meat and rice, with a 
goal to import machinery to produce these products at home. These policies concentrated on 
the eastern lowlands and left the indigenous majority—the producers of the majority of the 
country’s food supply—absent from conversations. This was particularly devastating for 
Andean quinoa farmers as seen by the decline in national production of quinoa during the 
1960s and 1970s (Healy 2001, 42). Indigenous food producers suffered from, “exacerbated 
terms of trade inequities…’the markets were overflowing with consumer products yet, they 
had no money to purchase them’” (Healy 2001, 53).  
 
2.3 The Rebirth of the Quinoa Economy 
2.3.1 1960s International Development Projects 
Another concept Escobar introduces is how development is productive in making 
underdevelopment politically and technically manageable (2012, 46). The destruction of the 
indigenous food system exemplifies such a process. For centuries Bolivia’s majority 
indigenous population was suppressed in order for mestizo elites to maintain political power. 
Eliminating the local food market was part of this plan. Between 1964 and 1978 multiple 
military regimes ruled the country, returning the dubious title of “the world’s most coup 
prone republic” to Bolivia (Healy 2001, 13). To support these regimes from turning 
communist and in an attempt to modernize Bolivia, the US government invested heavily in 
aid and especially in the agricultural sector (Healy 2001, 19). Simultaneously, in the late 
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1960s in a remote part of the southern Altiplano on the shores of the Uyuni salt flats, Belgian 
missionaries constructed a lime factory “with the aim of raising the standards of living of the 
indigenous population by more effectively utilizing local resources” (Healy 2001, 162). Their 
project follows Escobar’s definition of development: to transform peasants to pursue the goal 
of economic progress as seen through the lens of capitalism (2012). Although the lime 
factory was not economically successful it was productive in creating a tractor rental service. 
Access to tractors prompted local farmers to start uprooting the shrubs that grew on the 
pampas in order to plant quinoa, which until that time only grew on the hillsides. This 
mechanization unintentionally led to great capacity for quinoa to be planted on more hectors 
of land. Consequently, the agricultural frontier could be extended to the flat terrain by 
enabling virgin lands with irregular topography, fragile soils with low water holding capacity 
to grow quinoa. Although this development project did not explicitly aim to promote 
increased quinoa production, it introduced the idea of using the pampas for agricultural 
production as opposed to just herding (Healy 2001, 163). The lime factory “development 
project” did produce an outcome however; the outcome was not the original intent. 
 
2.3.2 1970s: Formation of Peasant Cooperatives 
Quinoa decreased as a dietary staple of Bolivia during the 1960s (Healy 2001), but 
quinoa farming never disappeared from Andean culture. Peasants maintained hope in 
growing quinoa a source of income. This section discusses the role of peasant cooperatives in 
development of a new Bolivian quinoa market. Cooperatives became, and still are, essential 
in enabling quinoa to reach external marketplaces. Cooperatives allow an international buyer 
a central source through which to purchase large quantities of quinoa thus avoiding the need 
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to locate individual farming households. Furthermore, cooperatives are able to control for 
quality through training programs and financial support to farming households for organic 
farming. While the community-led project to export quinoa was accepted by development the 
way in which the locals organized was dictated by development. Robert Andolina, Nina 
Laurie and Sarah Radcliffe label this combination of use of local knowledge combined with 
development strategy as the junction when, “indigenous policy and advocacy networks 
intersect to define a transnational but grounded frontier between culturally appropriate 
development and developmentally appropriate culture” (2009, 3). The historical progression 
of the creation of the first peasant cooperative is outlined in the following paragraphs.  
Bolivian quinoa producers were at first subjects of western development, however as 
aid workers realized their original project was not helping the community they made the 
decision to turn the project over to locals. In 1974, one of the Belgian missionaries decided to 
enlist the help of locals to shift the development model from top-down management to 
community participation. There were two important changes: first, the priest sought out 
locals, Macario Bautista, a peasant leader, and Jaime Alba, a development professional, to 
return to the Altiplano and work on a project to revitalize quinoa; secondly, he transferred 
ownership of the program to the community by setting up a cooperative. Bautista and Alba 
were native to the Altiplano and had witnessed out migration of youth from the area due to 
lack of opportunity. This was in large part because, as Healy notes, “earnings from quinoa 
were so meager that it was difficult for their families to make ends meet” (Healy 2001, 165). 
The two leaders of the group contrived the idea to place quinoa at the center of development 
strategy in order to “stimulate the communities to take initiative” (Ibid). According to 
Bautista, the co-op idea was a foreign idea  (Healy 2001, 163). While missionaries 
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recognized the local knowledge redesigned their project to be culturally appropriate by 
focusing on a native crop and then by forming a co-op they produced “developmentally 
appropriate culture” (Andolina et al 2009).   
During the 1970 small producers started to form community-based committees, 
Organizaciones Economicas Campisinas (OECAs), Peasant Economic Organizations, in an 
attempt to search for market opportunities to bypass intermediaries (Raynolds 2007,183). 
The first Andean organization of quinoa growing peasants, Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (CECAOT), was founded in 1975 and comprised 14 cooperatives from the Nor 
Lipez province in Potosi (Ibid). This federation emerged from the agricultural project begun 
by Bautista and Alba (Ibid). Traditionally, peasant producers kept most of their quinoa for 
their own household consumption (Cáceres et al. 2007).  For the quinoa they did want to sell, 
producers had no other alternative other than to sell it to intermediaries who obtained the 
product for buyers in Challapata1, the central marketplace in Bolivia where the price of 
quinoa is set. Intermediaries had almost a complete monopoly over quinoa trade and were 
highly exploitative, accused of using over-weight scales, under-quoting prices, and in 
general, treating the farmers unfairly (Ofstehage 2012). The development agenda of the 
1960s profoundly influenced the price of quinoa. By the 1970s, the price paid to the quinoa 
producer was equivalent to one third of the cost of imported wheat (Cáceres et al. 2007).  
Indigenous quinoa farmers were aware of the nutritional qualities of their crop and 
wanted to break free from the necessity of selling to intermediaries. For the peasant 
organization throughout the 1970s, the issue was twofold: lack of an efficient machine to 
thoroughly process and clean quinoa inhibited them from producing a crop of export quality; 																																																								1	The “Challapata Fair” is also known as the “Black Market” since most of the quinoa destine 
towards the bordering country of Peru is smuggled through this market/location. 2	This	paper	refers	to	the	fair	trade	movement	as	“fair	trade”	and	distinguishes	certified	products	as	
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and economic policy made exports difficult which inhibited farmers from obtaining a fairer 
price. Because local government agricultural stations never adequately supported quinoa 
peasants, CECAOT’s objective was to, “stimulate the communities to take initiatives rather 
than waiting for government agencies” (Healy 2001, 165). The first members of CECAOT 
had the idea to organize the “Primer Encuentro de Productores de Quinua del Altiplano Sur” 
(The First Meeting of Quinoa Growers of the Southern Altiplano). It brought together over 
150 Aymara and Quechua peasants as well as foreign donors (Healy 2001, 165). From this 
meeting came the idea to form a committee tasked with the top priority of obtaining a 
processing machine to remove the saponins in order to improve the quality of the product. 
According to Healy, “as early as the 1970s the Peruvian food industry was profiting from 
selling processed quinoa products from Bolivian quinoa” (Healy 2001, 167). Private funding 
was sought because the co-op did not receive support from local government agricultural 
stations (Healy 2001, 166). With funding from Catholic Relief Services, CECAOT obtained 
the dehusking machine but it only removed 60-70 percent of the saponins (Healy 2001, 167). 
The first dehusking machine was installed in the same town as the co-op headquarters. They 
choose Julaca because electricity had been installed for the town’s lime industry (Healy 
2001, 167). Throughout the decade CECAOT sought funding from international NGOs, 
specifically the International Agricultural Foundation (IAF), to obtain improved processing 
technology that would allow the co-op to increase the quality of their crop and allow for 
more time to be spent on marketing efforts (Ibid).  
 
2.3.3 The 1980s: New Economic Reforms and New Markets 
The 1980s brought about political, social and economic change to Bolivia following 
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sixteen years of military rule. Throughout the 1980s, Latin American countries suffered 
serious economic and social crises characterized by growing external debts, poverty and high 
levels of unemployment. By the end of the so-called “lost decade,” one quarter of the entire 
population lived in households that earned less than one dollar a day (Thrupp 1995, 15). To 
obtain loans from the International Monetary Fund, governments had to agree to Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (Moberg and Lyon 2010, 3). In 1985, the new Bolivian 
government introduced neoliberal economic policies aimed at stabilizing the economy 
through structural adjustment via reducing the role of the state in the economy. This was 
done through measures such as privatizing national industries, removing subsidies, 
liberalizing trade and overall, integrating the country into global markets (Healy 2001, 51). A 
feature in the New Economic Plan (NEP) was to open up the market to more imports but also 
to make it easier to export. In attempts to increase economic growth, repay debts and reduce 
reliance on traditional exports (coffee, sugar cane, beef), international agencies began 
promoting cash crop exports as a central part of trade liberalization and structural adjustment 
policies (Thrupp 1995, 3).  
The economic shift away from import substitution and toward neoliberal policies 
coincided with a demand for non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs), organic products 
and health foods (Thrupp 1995, 3). According to Thrupp, “non-traditional export values from 
Latin America grew steadily reaching $430 million by 1991” (1995, 58). To be defined as a 
non-traditional agroexport the export must be either 1) not traditionally produced in a 
particular country; 2) was traditionally produced for domestic consumption but is now 
exported; or 3) is a traditional product now exported to a new market (Thrupp 2005, 2).  
Quinoa, “as a traditional product now exported to a new market,” met the definition. It also 
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fit into the governmental policies aimed towards opening new markets and increasing 
exports. A government funded development project acted as another influence for organic 
conversion. The Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture in partnership with 
the market study on quinoa conducted by the Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture confirmed the 
potential for growth among European organic food buyers. It also listed “Real Blanca” 
quinoa grain as the one most accepted by consumers in the North (Cáceres et al. 2007, 184). 
The impact on the conversation to organic farming will be discussed in chapter three. 
 
2.3.4. International Technical Cooperation 
From the beginning of their project to expand the quinoa export production, the 
Bolivian peasant organizations understood the need to add value to their product through 
initial processing. Not only did quinoa producers lead the efforts to find new buyers for their 
crop, but they also played a role in developing the next phase in the quinoa supply chain. The 
decade when cooperatives needed funding to improve quinoa-processing equipment, the 
1990s, coincided a “‘new development paradigm,’ which emphasized ‘decentralization, 
community development, privatization, minimal government, popular participation, and 
flexible forms of foreign aid’” (Werlin, 1992 as sited in Stenn, 2013). First introduced under 
the Banzer government in the late 1990s and further developed under the Mesa 
administration, in the early 2000s, the new policy focused on developing external buyers for 
Bolivian products thus replacing the former model of production and productive 
infrastructure (Ton & Bijman, 2006). Because the highland peasants had already formed 
cooperatives, they were poised to take advantage of this new paradigm to support community 
development. At the same time, development was beginning to ask for community 
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participation as a means to increase project effectiveness (Cornwall 2000 as sited in Stenn, 
2013). Development agencies were poised to finance projects run by locally managed 
cooperatives. The result was a significant increase during the 1990s of construction of quinoa 
processing plants with funding by the United Nations. Moreover, the International Technical 
Cooperation Program (ITC) financed the process of converting quinoa producers into agro-
business operators (Cáceres et al. 2007, 184). In 1990, the United National Development 
Programme (UNDP) financed a quinoa processing plant for ANAPQUI and by 1997 
CECAOT obtained a new technology for debittering its quinoa. Dryers instead of rinsing 
machines promised to remove 100% of the saponins (Healy 2001,187). A loan from the 
Inter-American Development Bank greatly helped the organization reach new buyers by 
allowing CECOAT to “expand the co-op’s quinoa processing almost threefold and greatly 
improve membership training” (Healy 2001, 180). In turn, growers were able to sell to the 
United States, though sales fluctuated in the mid-90s due to low crop yields and developing 
demand. However, in time and through marketing, rising demand for health foods and the 
increase in organic production increased international interest in quinoa. By 1997 quinoa was 
the highest priced grain on the world market (Healy 2001, 188).  
 
2.4 Globalization Via Supply Chain “Development” 
During the late 1990’s and early 2000s, neoliberalism was the framework for 
development (Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe 2009). In their study on development projects 
in the Andes Andolina, Laurie and Radcliffee (2009) conclude that although communities 
tried to differentiate themselves from interventionist development work by embracing their 
local knowledge to create income, development absorbed these projects. The development 
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community recognized that funding projects at the state level was not effective and therefore 
began to shift resources to the local level (Ibid). In the 1990s cooperatives benefited from a 
development policy that recognized the value in applying local knowledge to advance the 
global quinoa trade. In 1999 there was a shift to supply chain development as the primary 
focus for agricultural development in Bolivia. As Carimentrand (2015) writes, “NGOs aimed 
to better prices and add value at the various levels of the quinoa supply chain, by taking care 
of collection, hulling, partial processing and marketing” (332). At the same time, the success 
of the quinoa export market caught the attention of the government. In fact, the Bolivian 
government invested in a program to help determine which actors along the chain would be 
the most efficient. In 2000 the government set up the Bolivian System of Productivity and 
Competitiveness (SBPC) to concentrate government resources on products where Bolivia had 
a competitive advantage and market potential in international markets (Ton & Bijman 2006). 
The result of the study concluded that producer organizations were inefficient as quinoa 
processors and exporters due to their presumed inability to react timely to changing market 
demands (Ton & Bijman, 2006, 9). Producer organizations were assigned the role of farmer 
instead of being able to continue to pursue the role they had chosen for themselves, farmers, 
processors and exporters. In their study on Bolivian producer organizations Ton & Bijman 
state, “the quinoa case is a clear example of the complex and sometimes conflictive 
interaction of government and (international) development NGOs on one hand and producer 
organizations on the other” (2006, 12). By being more concerned about introducing quinoa to 
the global economy the government and NGOs began to silo farmers into a role of producer, 
thus taking away the opportunity for producers to increase profit margins by processing their 
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own product. Chapter three explains in greater detail the financial consequences suffered by 
the original two peasant organizations when they faced competition from private business.  
   
2.5 Fair Trade as Development 
Government support of non-traditional agricultural exports combined with the 
growing health food movement in the Global North were two important influences on 
cooperatives ability to find a new buyer. The first quinoa buyer from outside the Andes 
region was America social scientist David Cusack from Colorado. In 1983 he formed Quinoa 
Corporation and placed the first order for quinoa from CECAOT for 200 tons of quinoa 
(Healy 2001, 175). Quinoa Corporation’s cofounder, Steve Gorad, hoped that if Bolivians 
saw the desire the north had for its crop that the stigma could be lifted from its native 
country; producers would have access to two new markets, the north and the local economy 
(Laguna 2006). According to its website, “we began out of commitment to sourcing the 
highest quality quinoa and supporting the farmers who grow it” (Quinoa Corporation). This 
purchase represents two important elements of quinoa’s new marketplace. The first is 
quinoa’s ability to be imported into the USA for its status as a non-traditional export product, 
and secondly the buyer’s desire to help the producers. The rise in quinoa exports follows the 
increase in popularity of organic health foods in the Global North, the space where non-
traditional agricultural crops were sold, and the buyer’s aspiration to partner in solidarity 
with farmers through the purchase of their crop, even prior to quinoa’s Fairtrade2 
certification. Quinoa was not officially granted status as a Fairtrade product by the Fairtrade 
Labeling Organizations (FLO) until 2004, however private organizations purchased quinoa 																																																								2	This	paper	refers	to	the	fair	trade	movement	as	“fair	trade”	and	distinguishes	certified	products	as	“Fairtrade.”		
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with a voluntary willingness to be in solidarity with the actors, farmers, processors, importers 
and retailers (Laguna 2003, 29). The term alternative trade relationship predates the term fair 
trade. Alternative trade dates to the 1950s when Oxfam and Ten Thousand Villages began 
work to improve the prices received by artisans in the developing world for exported 
products (Jaffee 2007). In the USA, alternative trade gained traction in the 1980s when fair 
trade coffees were marketed alongside the Central American solidarity movement (Lyon 
2015, 159). The partnership between Bolivian farmers and alternate trade organization was 
critical to the success of quinoa expansion. According to Cáceres et al. (2007) “the 
partnership between quinoa producers and the solidary market consolidated the expansion of 
quinoa, thus increasing exports and allowing the product to break out of the Andean market” 
(184).  
Fair trade is a trading partnership that seeks greater equity in international trade 
(Lyon 2015, 159). The growth of the fair trade movement coincided with the expansion of 
neoliberalism as a direct result of consumers’ awareness of the unfair burdens placed on 
southern producers under the system of free trade. They wanted an alternative means to 
purchase products, one that would provide a more direct line from source to consumer; it was 
assumed this would bring a fairer price for the producer (Moberg and Lyon 2010, 7). 
European alternative trade organizations backed fair trade. By 1997 there were 17 fair trade 
labels across Europe and North America promoting the creation of the umbrella organization 
Fairtrade International, which became responsible creating consistent certification standards 
across its members (Lyon 2015, 159).  The certification model shifted the movement from 
economic and social justice toward poverty alleviation. Lyon sees fair trade as a “perfect fit 
for a development community unified behind the goal of ending poverty” (2015, 163). 
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According to Nicholls and Opal, “fair trade has interlinked aims: alleviate extreme poverty 
through trade and to empower smallholder farmers and farm workers to use trade 
relationships as a means of enhancing their social capital” (Nicholls and Opal 2005, 25). 
Many scholars have written critiques on fair trade (Nicholls and Opal 2005, Jaffee 2007, 
Lyon and Moberg 2010, Carimentrand and Ballet 2010, Valiente-Riedl 2013, Lyon 2015). A 
major critique is the contradiction embedded in the concept itself. Fair trade seeks to achieve 
social justice and alter the unjust terms of trade that hurt small farmers worldwide by 
utilizing the mechanisms of the very markets that have generated those injustices (Jaffee 
2007). Fair trade works to “correct market failures to make the trading system work for 
everyone, Fairtrade is, in fact, a neo-liberal solution to problems with trade” (Jones 2004 as 
sites in Nicholls and Opal 2005).  
However, fair trade offers a new approach to the buyer-supplier relationship aimed at 
equality of exchange. It is a development tool that uses existing capitalist supply chains to 
return more income to producers (Nicholls & Opal 2005, 32). According to Fairtrade 
Labeling Organization (FLO), Fairtrade is a strategy that aims to produce sustainable 
development and reduce poverty through fairer trade. The main goals are, “to make changes 
to the conventional trading system that benefit small producers working in the South and 
increase their access to markets” (FLO 2011, 4). To indicate a brand’s certification of 
operating under fair principles, the Fairtrade system uses a label. To obtain the label, a 
product must meet a series of criteria though fair trade organizations frame the standards 
differently (Jaffee 2007, 2). Like all FLO products, the FLO Fairtrade Standard for quinoa 
requires that at least half of the members be a small-scale producer organization, which is 
defined as: farm work done mostly by members and their families and do not hire workers all 
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year round (FLO 2011, 7).  
Only in the past few years have critiques of fair trade focus on fair trade’s hired labor 
standards (Brown 2013; Lyon 2015).3 These critiques are important to understanding the 
class divisions, and potential economic disparities between Bolivian farmers. Fair trade 
thinks in terms of small producers and plantation labor causing it to largely ignore wage 
labor (Lyon 2015). Wage labor is not itself bad, but by disregarding wage laborers fair trade 
fails to incorporate the full spectrum of the political economy in which producers are 
operating. As Fraser et al. state, Fairtrade is a “strategic resource bound to power relations 
and politics that are negotiated and contested in a variety of arenas from international to 
local” (2014, 18). The following paragraphs place the quinoa boom into the context of local 
politics and explores the power relations Fairtrade has contributed to, albeit unintentionally.   
To understand the impact of large-scale production in the Altiplano we first need to 
understand land rights. Exports of Fairtrade quinoa are of salinas variety, primarily quinua 
real (royal quinoa) grown along the shores of the salt flats (also called the inter-solar) and 
has become the most prized quinoa on the global market (Rojas et al. 2010). This is also an 
area of Bolivia where traditional indigenous trading partnership, known as ayllu, still exists 
today (Kerssen 2015, 4). Due to the harshness of the terrain in the Altiplano making the 
territory undesirable for the hacienda system, the ayllu survived the Spanish conquest of the 
16th century. It survived the 1952 agrarian reform that abolished the hacienda system, 
because of the lack of haciendas, and it survived the 1970s dictatorships’ agrarian reforms 
because they focused on the fertile land in the eastern lowlands (Ibid). In present day, this 
ancient method of land distribution has caused controversy and intensified inequalities in the 																																																								3	They build on previous research by other scholars (Luetchford 2008; Utting 2009) on why fairtrade producers 
hired laborers and found similar conclusions in that one family struggles to manage the harvest using only 
family labor.	
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area. Under the system of ayllu a member of the community can appropriate land by clearing 
it. Before tractors land was cleared by hand (Felix 2004 as sites in Carimentrand and Ballet 
2010). The introduction of tractors allowed quinoa cultivation to move from the mountain 
slopes to the plains. According to several researchers (Laguna 2000, Felix 2009, 
Carimentrand and Ballet 2010) this shift from the traditional growing regions to the plains is 
a cause of the socioeconomic differentiation. The introduction of tractors impacted the 
distribution of land ownership and a drastic reduction of common land used for the pastures 
for lamas. The mechanization of quinoa has resulted in the differentiation between various 
quinoa-producing communities within the Altiplano. Carimentrand and Ballet view the 
inequalities in terms of topography; “mountain” communities have been excluded from 
mechanization whereas largely “plains” and “mixed” communities have participated in 
modernizing agriculture (2010,7). Those who had assets (livestock) in exchange for 
agricultural machinery have been able to benefit the most (Ibid).  
A second shift in power relations took place during the boom, resulting from the 
return of members to their home community. Specifically, the rising price for quinoa on the 
international commodities market attracted urban youth whose parents or grandparents 
migrated from the Altiplano to the larger city. The quinoa boom has created tension at the 
community level between residentes, those who have left their land, and estantes (Kerssen 
2015).  In her research on this topic, Tanya Kerssen points to how residentes mange their 
production remotely which has led to intra-community and even intra-familial conflict 
(Kerssen 2015, 10).4 Furthermore, much of the land is not owned as private property, but 
																																																								4	In	July	2014	I	attended	an	event	sponsor	by	Food	First	and	listened	to	Tanya	Kerssen	speak	about	the	current	situation	in	the	Altiplano.	Despite	living	in	LaPaz,	Tanya	knew	quinoa	farmers	“residents”	who	expressed	positive	emotions	for	being	able	to	return	to	their	family’s	land	to	grow	quinoa	but	also	mixed	feelings	on	the	tension	this	was	causing	in	the	community.		
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rather held as indigenous communal territory known as “communal territory of origin;” the 
communal title was hard-won by social movements and became law in 1994 (Kerssen 2015, 
12). The broad requirements of Fairtrade, such as the FLO’s standard that states Fairtrade 
producers do not hire workers all year round does not take into account these cultural 
complexities nor the local laws that exist where quinoa is grown. As this example illustrates, 
there is a need for what Lyon calls on Fairtrade to do which is “closely consider local 
agrarian histories within the broader context of regional political, economic, and cultural 
processes” (2015, 176).  
In addition to exasperating inequalities, mechanization in the Altiplano has played a 
large role in creating environmental problems. Incorporating environmental requirements 
into Fairtrade standards has intensified the buyer-supplier power relation and placed an 
emphasis on the development piece of fair trade. This has happened through the requirement 
of organic certification and the predetermination of the use of the social premium. Almost 
from the start of the new buyer-supplier relationship organic production became a 
requirement. According to Cáceres et al. (2007) in 1989 a German alternative trade 
organization (ATO), GEPA5, centralized the demand for quinoa from European ATOs. This 
played a crucial role in creating a link between fair trade consumers in the north and small 
producers in the south. GEPA also convinced ANAPQUI to produce organic quinoa for its 
social and ecological quality in a major attempt to reach the European solidarity market 
(184). This began to set the precedent for organic certified quinoa. Fairtrade and organic now 
nearly go hand in hand, with organic certification as a requirement for Fairtrade certification. 
Organic restrictions are becoming stricter, some even requiring that subsistence food plots 
are organic (Jaffe 2007, 251). Again, this is unrealistic for the average farmer to be able to 																																																								5	GEPA	stands	for	Gesellschaft	zur	Förderung	der	Partnerschaft	mit	der	Dritten	Welt	mbH	
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comply with and would leave only larger scale farmers as organic and thus Fairtrade 
certified. The costs of organic certification and inspection have typically been the 
responsibility of the producer (Jaffee 2007). The cost of organic certification potentially 
contributes to income disparity and class divisions in the countryside. In their critique of fair 
trade Carimentrand and Ballet posit that one of the reasons why fair trade causes more 
unfairness is in large part because of the “inappropriate standards that do not take into 
account the inequalities between producers” (2010). The above referenced authors point to 
the definition of “small producer” as defined by FLO as contributing to inequality. Small 
producer is not based on an income cap, but instead is based on the ability to work their farm 
mainly using their own labor while not relying on salaried labor. As the authors point out, the 
seasonal labor employed by many larger farms would not disqualify these farms 
(Carimentrand and Ballet 2010, 11). They also point to a mismatch between the principles of 
fair trade and the objectives of the producers claiming that fair trade doesn’t take into 
account the power relationships that are woven into these organizations linked to 
socioeconomic stratification (Carimentrand and Ballet 2010, 10). Looking at the price paid to 
producers illuminates the income discrepancies. In 2005, prices vary from 250 Bolivianos 
($31 USD) to 50,000 Bolivianos ($6,211 USD). The producer organization, ANAPQUI, buys 
quinoa through its regional organizations. Larger payments were made to a regional 
organization where many of the large mechanized farms are located (Carimentrand and 
Ballet 2010, 9). According to Carimentrand and Ballet (2010) ANAPQUI and its regional 
organizations exert control by a few groups of influential groups. The abovementioned 
authors conclude that, “in the case of quinoa, the exclusion tends to result from the self-
exclusion of small producers due to the mechanisms of the ‘privileges’ that the bigger 
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producers, who also have a preponderant weight in the organizations, assign to themselves” 
(Ibid).  
In 2003 when quinoa was being reviewed for its compatibility to become a Fairtrade 
certified product there already existed a concern that a boom would have negative impact on 
the environment (Laguna 2003).  To improve their social capital peasants often need 
investment and training. Fairtrade’s solution comes in the form of the social premium, an 
agreed upon payment made to the suppliers on top of the cost of the price of goods to allow 
them to collectively implement larger scale development projects (Nicholls and Opal 2005, 
6). By 2012, FLO recognized the strong increase in demand for quinoa and consequent price 
increase had lead to an intensification of production. This prompted the FLO to make 
suggestions on how to further improve environmental sustainability (FLO 2012, 2). The new 
standard states that 30% of the Fairtrade premium should be dedicated to invest in 
environmentally sustainable quinoa production and processing measures. The remaining 
premium is earmarked for community projects (FLO 2012, 1). In theory, how the social 
premium is spent is voted on by the members. However, certifiers are suggesting how the 
premium is spent in particular because of environmental concerns associated with increased 
production. Fairtrade participants must be dedicated to investment in environmentally 
sustainable quinoa production (FLO 2012).  In their 2012 standards revision, Fairtrade 
recognized: “as the competition is rising in the international quinoa market, measures need to 
be implemented to adopt a more sustainable approach in order to ensure Fairtrade quinoa 
production continues on a long-term basis” (FLO 2012). Looking carefully at the way this is 
phrased, it appears Fairtrade has more of an interest in preserving its business model versus a 
concern for producers and their ability to maintain a sustainable livelihood through quinoa 
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farming. The environmental measures include encouraging farmers to limit soil erosion, keep 
llamas or alpacas for manure production, and the planting of living fences (native trees and 
shrubs) to protect against wind erosion. Included in the standards is the recommendation that 
producer organizations create basic conditions and services to train members on sustainable 
methods of mechanized cultivation (FLO 2012). It is suggested that funds from the premium 
can be used to support these programs. 
Lastly, in his ethnographic study on southern Altiplano quinoa farmers, Ofstehage 
(2010) critiques Fairtrade for cutting out the middlemen. His study provides context on why 
farmers choose to sell quinoa to intermediaries. He explains a regional quinoa economy in 
which producers play an active role in their decision-making and intermediaries are not 
always deceptive figures, but rather they play multiple roles all of which are integral to that 
regional food network. One of those roles is to supply the local market with quinoa because 
“nearly all of the quinoa sold by cooperatives is exported and much of the quinoa purchased 
by companies as well; quinoa purchased by intermediaries often ends up in the markets 
within Bolivia” (Ofstehage 2010, 64).  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Previous development projects laid the foundation for Fairtrade to easily partner with 
cooperatives utilizing farmers’ familiarity with outside certifications and the importers’ 
marketing strategy to consumers to act in solidary with farmers. The quinoa boom owes its 
growth to alternative trade organization, which later became the fair trade movement. 
Thinking of fair trade as a model for poverty alleviation exposes Fairtrade certifications for 
what they are, as an imposed set of standards from northern buyers onto southern producers 
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in the name of “development.” According to Lyon (2007) the growth of the fair trade 
movement reflects the popular notion of “trade not aid,” that northern consumers should act 
with progressive movements to use the international economy to empower the historically 
less powerful (109). Aside from research conducted by Carimentrand and Ballet (2010) and 
Hellin and Higman (2001) there has been little other research in recent years on the impact of 
fair trade on quinoa farmers. There is ample research on the positive and negative impact of 
fair trade on indigenous farmers’ organizations producing other commodities (Moberg 2005, 
Lyon 2007, Arce 2009) for which to draw comparisons to quinoa. The same issues that affect 
other participates of fair trade likely exists within the quinoa economy. Until more empirical 
research on the impact of Fairtrade on Bolivian quinoa farmers is conducted there will 
remain mixed opinions on the impact of Fairtrade to the Altiplano.6 Forthcoming literature by 
PhD student, Enrico Avitabile, who is writing his dissertation on the impact of quinoa 
exports to food security, sovereignty and social systems among quinoa producers (Gabriel 
2013) could provide new insights and more recent data on the experience of participating in 
the global quinoa economy.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a shift in policy from import-substitution programs to 
export-oriented development strategies (Bair 2005). I argue we can draw parallel conclusions 
to the case of quinoa to Tanya Li’s study of the cacao industry with highland indigenous 
farmers in Indonesia. Li concludes, “Nor was there a misguided development scheme that 
disrupted their old way of life. The noncommoditized social relations through which they 
previously accessed land, labor, and food were not destroyed by ‘capitalism.’ They eroded 
piecemeal, in a manner that was unexpected and unplanned” (Li 2014). The increasing price 																																																								6	For	quinoa	farmers	fairtrade	means	a	fair	price.	In	a	conversation	with	a	manager	at	CECAOT	(February	2014)	when	asked	about	comercio	justo	(fair	trade)	he	responded,	“fair	trade	is	not	fair,	it	does	not	always	give	us	the	best	price.”	
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paid for quinoa attracted more farmers, more buyers, and more processors increasing 
competition for the original producer organizations. Quinoa’s success as a global commodity 
created the unintended consequence of attracting more participants leading to a slow 
corrosion of relationships among actors in the supply chain.   
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CHAPTER THREE:  
 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF A GROWING VALUE CHAIN  
 
 
3.1 A Growing Quinoa Value Chain  
 
The original Bolivian quinoa supply chain included subsistence farmers selling their 
unprocessed product to a middleman who smuggled the quinoa into Peru for processing and 
consumption. In the 1980s peasant cooperatives actively engaged in a new exchange, they 
sold processed quinoa directly to buyers in the Global North. The success of quinoa in 
international marketplace had a positive impact on the amount of funding peasants received 
to upgrade processing machinery and later had a negative impact on the changed relationship 
between suppliers and buyers. The focus on poverty reduction led some groups to direct 
efforts toward commodity specific producer organizations (Bebbington 2005 as cited in 
Lyons 2007). In the Altiplano these efforts manifested in development agencies, such as 
UNDP, USAID and ITC, funding the creation of quinoa processing equipment for producer 
organizations7. The purpose was to help these organizations decrease quinoa-processing time 
and increase quality, which are two necessary requirements to participate in the commodities 
exchange. This chapter focuses on the growing complexity of the quinoa supply chain. This 
complexity was caused by the upgrades necessary to meet the quantity and quality demanded 
by international quinoa buyers and the expectations of Fairtrade certifying organizations. The 
result was a more industrialized supply chain characteristic of less reliance on traditional 
farming methods and a shift from buyers purchasing in solidarity with farmers to a business 
																																																								7	In	an	informal	conversation	with	a	2006	Bolivian	Peace	Corps	volunteer	who,	from	2005-2006	was	partnered	with	a	Dutch	agricultural	development	agency	in	Ururo.	She	mentioned	that	at	the	time,	farmers	in	this	region	were	unsure	what	to	do	with	quinoa.	Meanwhile,	the	region	to	the	south	was	building	a	new	market	for	the	crop.		
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transaction. The impact of industrialization of the quinoa economy is the focus of this 
chapter.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Lens: Global Value Chains 
This chapter analyzes the positive and negative effects of the quinoa economy on 
producers through the Global Value Chain (GVC) lens. I use the Global Value Chain 
framework to analyze the quinoa supply chain in order to be able to gain deeper insight into 
the effects of the global marketplace on the social dynamics in the countryside as a result of 
the changing purchasing terms placed on producers by their buyers. The comprehensiveness 
of the framework allows us to answer questions regarding development issues that have not 
been addressed by previous paradigms (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). The value chain 
framework allows for a clearer understanding of the various actors involved throughout the 
supply chain and exposes the various power structures within it. GVC analysis allows for 
more insightful conclusions about the unintended consequences of the Bolivian Quinoa 
Economy.  
There is a cluster of scholars interested in studying the effects of globalization in what 
they have named Global Commodity Chains (GCCs). According to Jennifer Bair (2005),  
“GCC helps us analyze the local consequences of globalization for firms and workers” (155). 
The commodity chain concept8 appears in world-systems research throughout the 1980s 
(Ibid). In 1994, Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz edited a set of papers that were 
previously presented at a conference on Political Economy of the World-System. They 
																																																								8	The term ‘commodity’ was first introduced by Terrence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein in a 1977 article 
“Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System.” The authors defined ‘commodity chain’ as the, 
“linked set of processes,” of a set of inputs necessary to create a consumable product (Hopkins and Wallerstein 
1997 as sited in Bair 2005, 155).	
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presented what became an influential paper in which the authors outlined a framework for the 
study of what they called global commodity chains (Bair, 2005, 155). Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz (1994) define Global Commodity Chains as having an “emphasis on the 
internal governance of supply chains and the role of diverse lead firms in setting up global 
production and sourcing networks.” As summarized by Bair (2005), “the central question that 
appears to motivate many GCC and value chain researchers is how (especially developing-
country) firms can improve their positions within these chains so as to generate and retain 
more value” (164). More specifically, as Gereffi notes, the value chain perspective, 
“problematizes the question of governance—how chains are organized and managed…this 
helps us ask the questions about the winners and losers on the globalization process, how and 
why the gains from globalization are spread, and how the number of gainers can be 
increased” (Gereffi et. al 2001, 3). Understanding the Bolivian quinoa economy through the 
lens of GVC allows for a deeper understanding of who has gained the most from the increase 
in quinoa exports. The following sections explain how both the import-led and the export-led 
economic policy effected quinoa’s consumer base. The latter revived the crop however the 
benefits of its revival are unequally distributed.   
 
3.3 Mapping the Value Chain 
3.3.1 Producer Organizations: CECAOT and ANAPQUI 
The quinoa value chain consists of producers (farmers), producer organizations (POs) 
at the regional and national level, private processing firms, exporters, importers and 
distributors and retailers. In Bolivia, quinoa is still produced almost entirely by peasant 
producers. It is estimated that there are at least 70,000 small producers who on average grow 
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1 hectare of quinoa per family. These peasants are central to the flow of quinoa to local, 
regional and export markets (Salcedo 2015, 326). Small-scale farmers tend to grow quinoa 
for self-consumption whereas medium to large famers produce for commercial sale. In the 
early 1970s, peasant producers had virtually no other option on who to sell quinoa to other 
than intermediaries. Intermediaries, or middleman, based their buying price of quinoa on the 
price set at the Challapata market. Challapata is the central quinoa market where it is traded 
(Carimentrand, et al. 2015, 331). Desaguadero is a small town on the border of Bolivia and 
Peru where Bolivian quinoa is sold to Peruvian intermediaries. This practice of the valuation 
of quinoa began in the 1950s in unregistered markets (mainly Challapata) destined for 
internal markets and Peru via a network of middlemen. Middlemen had the reputation for 
using over-weight scales, under-quoting prices, and generally treating farmers unfairly 
(Oftehage 2012, 446). Middlemen buy quinoa at weekly farmers markets and sell to 
wholesalers who buy in large volumes to supply the urban markets, processing plants or 
larger markets. Farmers, through the formation of the producer organizations, sought to 
improve through economic standing by obtaining a fairer buyer, one that would offer a better 
price, and by adding value to the role of the PO through the expansion of their capabilities 
into the areas of processing, storage and commercialization. 
Producer organizations have played an important role in the potential building of 
international demand for quinoa. They are also important to rural development in that they 
support both economic development and social cohesion. POs have multiple economic 
functions such as: collecting, processing, marketing and selling agricultural products, 
implementing quality assurance programs, and giving advice and training to members (Ton 
& Bijman 2006, 1). In Ton & Bijman’s case study on the chain development process for 
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quinoa in Bolivia, the authors define POs as an important instrument for rural development in 
their ability to “play a major role in national and international agrifood supply chains, as they 
are an intermediary between often a large number of individual farming households and a 
relative small number of customers” (Ton & Bijman, 2006).  
There are fifty-five varieties of quinoa grown however, only four regions in Bolivia 
grow the varieties demanded by international markets, all of them are Real variety: Real 
Blanca, Toledo, Phisanqalla (known as red), and Ch’iara (known as black) (PROINPA 2012). 
The two original producer organizations, ANAPQUI and CECAOT are located in the 
departments of Oruro and Potosí, which produce the largest amount of quinoa. In 2000 it was 
estimated these two groups together represented a total of 3,000 quinoa-producing 
households (CIOEC-Quinoa, 2000 as sited in Ton, 2006). When it was founded in 1974 
CECAOT consisted of 13 regional organizations, representing 200 members in the Nor Lipez 
province within the department of Potosí. Initially, the primary focus of CECAOT was to 
provide machinery and technical assistance for agriculture, but trade was still left to the 
intermediaries (Laguna 2003). A segment of the peasant organization’s members were not 
satisfied with the lack of attention paid to finding other buyers for their product. In 1982, 
CECAOT split into two entities and a second cooperative formed, ANAPQUI. Those who 
split from CECAOT did so in order to form an organization that would control the 
middlemen, better represent the peasants’ interests and generate collective benefits from 
trade. ANAPQUI consists of twelve regional organizations representing 1,679 members 
centrally located in and around Challapata and covering vast areas of the departments of 
Potosí, Oruro, bordering the salt flats of Uyuni (FairTade International, 2013). ANAPQUI 
was supported by the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
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(Laguna 2003).  It also decided to structure itself not as a member organization but rather to 
include both community and ayllus members to provide an alternative to private buyers. 
ANAPQUI produces three main varieties of quinoa – Blance Real, Rosada, and Pisankalla 
(Fair Trade USA). As Ton and Bijman explain, “the PO structures a specific business model 
within a supply chain that are qualitatively different than the sum of individual interests of 
their members” (3). Profit is not their prime objective; they look for ways to maximize the 
turnover of profits from their members. Their commercial activities are mostly realized in 
competition with private actors (middlemen) (Ibid).  
 
3.3.2 The Role of Middlemen 
As previously mentioned, the adverse impact middlemen had on peasants in the 
1970s prompted farmers to seek external buyers. In this regard, quinoa buyers can be divided 
into three main venues: a producer organization, private processing firm, and intermediaries 
(middlemen). However, Ofstehage (2012) has proven the important role that intermediaries 
play in the quinoa economy. The decision on who to sell to is complex and not all farmers 
agree with their neighbors’ decision. Some farmers are split between feeling a strong sense of 
regional solidarity by feeling closer ties to the local peasant organization, and identifying 
with the national farmer movement in solidarity with the national peasant organization.  Still 
others choose to sell to intermediaries (middlemen) to meet their immediate needs (Ofstehage 
2012). Despite the fact that the original impetus for peasants to find new buyers was because 
of the unfair treatment of middlemen, there is evidence that middlemen still play an 
important role. I point to Ofstehage as a means to show the role that middlemen play for the 
local quinoa economy.  
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No single buyer satisfies all farmers’ interests, but all do offer something 
irreplaceable and therefore contribute to farmer livelihoods...Cooperatives offer and 
maintain high quinoa prices and play an important social and political role in the 
farming communities, but accept only the highest quality quinoa, and some perceive 
the national cooperatives to be captured by the interests of rival quinoa farmers to the 
north. Intermediaries maintain low quality standards, offer flexible payment options, 
maintain close social bonds with farmers, and provide cheap, fresh food; however 
they offer comparatively low prices, mask the identity and distinctiveness of Lipeña 
quinoa, and will always remind some farmers of the exploitive intermediaries of time 
past (Ofstehage 2012, 451).  
 
Effel’s field research included interviews with farmers who also are representatives from 
private firms and the PO. Both share similar sentiments on why it is not always possible or 
desirable for farmers to sell to a cooperative: 
The thing is that ANAPQUI does not get to serve all of its producers. ANAPQUI 
restricts them. Despite being a pioneer firm along with CECAOT (which is nearby), 
[…] ANAPQUI cannot satisfy all of its producers. So their members actually come 
here to offer us quinoa. According to when we withdraw the money (receive 
payment), if our “strategic partners” (the farmers) do not offer us quinoa then their 
own members such as SOPROQUI9, CEDEINKU or APROQUILLAN come and 
offer us quinoa; so we buy their quinoa because it is also organic.’ 
Javier Veliz Ramos, Production Manager at private firm Real Andina (Effel 2012, 45) 
‘[…]. There are around 2.000 to 2.500 farmers that the association cannot buy the 
quinoa from all. For example, I have 10 to 20 quintals. If I have an emergency that 
day.. (meaning the day he wishes to sell his quinoa production), ANAPQUI will not 
buy my quinoa production immediately. Then in that case I will have to sell it 
immediately to somebody else in the “Black Market10.”’  
Ovidio Silvestre Alanoca, Responsible of personnel at ANAPQUI and quinoa farmer 
(Effel 2012, 45)  
     
One Fairtrade mandate is to cut out the middlemen, believing them to foster unfair 
buying practices. Ofstenhage concludes that what is “fair” is subject to an actor’s priority in 
commodity trade (2012, 453). He points to the fair trade movement for embracing farmer 
organizations and the potential for cooperatives to foster direct trading relationships between 
																																																								9	SOPROQUI,	CEDEINKU	and	APROQUILLAN	are	regional	producer	organizations	affiliated	under	ANAPQUI.	10	The	“Challapata	Fair”	is	also	known	as	the	“Black	Market”	since	most	of	the	quinoa	destine	towards	the	bordering	country	of	Peru	is	smuggled	through	this	market/location.		
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farmers and consumers (i.e., cutting out the middleman) (Ibid.). His case study “challenges 
our assumptions of narrowly defined solidarity networks and the ability of small hold farmers 
to create economic change” (2012 442). Furthermore, he shows that the farmers’ ability to 
choose a buyer and create new market channels offers them a measure of control, thus 
allowing farmers to widen their vision of development.  
 
3.4 Peasant Upgrading 
In order to be successful in expanding quinoa exportation, producers had to meet new 
demands in quantity and quality. The quinoa economy is a unique case study because quinoa 
cannot be consumed directly. This challenge presented an opportunity for peasants who were 
members of POs to play an important role downstream in the value chain by inserting 
themselves into the processing industry, a necessity for export. Bolivian quinoa farmers were 
always aware of the need to invest in processing equipment in order to obtain a buyer other 
than an intermediary. Because of financial support from international NGOs, as mentioned in 
section 2.3.4, during the 1990s, CECAOT and ANAPQUI emerged as mechanized primary 
processors of quinoa. For the first time farmers were both quinoa producers and processors. 
Since 1984 CECAOT and ANAPQUI facilitated the commercialization of quinoa real 
(Laguna 2006, 67). In time, these POs obtained greater control over production, primary 
processing and direct contact with international traders (Cáceres et al. 2007, 184). Value 
chain literature refers to the process of local firms improving their positions within a 
particular chain as upgrading (Bair 2005, 160). The consolidation of farming and processing 
was an important step in allowing producer organizations to upgrade within the quinoa chain. 
Upgrading of the producer turned the farmers’ organizations of the Southern Altiplano into 
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the most important actors of the quinoa value chain (Caceres 2005 as sited in Laguna 2006, 
67). According to Cáceres, Carimentrand, and Wilkinson (2007), until the first half of the 
1990s the peasant organizations had an almost absolute monopoly over quinoa exports. By 
1995, CECAOT had buyers in the US, Germany, Holland and an order from Japan on the 
way. The value of its sales had reached $380,000 (Healy 2001, 184). The POs were the main 
actors in the supply chain, as such, they were also the main recipients of the investments 
made into the value chain. “Between 1995 and 1999, ANAPQUI and CECAOT increased 
their share of Bolivian supply of quinoa exports from 47% to 52%” (Ton & Bijiman, 2016, 
9). Figure 1 shows the association value chain, producers selling directly to producer 
organizations. By 1995, notes Healy, “quinoa had become the most expensive grain per 
pound on the world market as European and United States demand now greatly exceed 
supply” (Healy 2001, 185). As quinoa exports increased, actors entered the chain in an 
attempt to cash in on the new demand. Upgrading that took place during the development of 
the quinoa supply chain prepared peasant organizations to compete with new private firms.   
 
Figure 1: Association Value Chain Model 
 
Farmer	 Regional	Association	 National	Association	
Foreign	Market	Local	Market	Private	Company	
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3.5 New Structures of Governance: The Demand for Organic 
Organic certification changed the buyer-supplier dynamic. In 1995 and 1999 
respectively, the USA and European quinoa demand shifted toward exclusively organic 
(Laguna 2006). This conversion to organic solidified a new set of buyers for Bolivian quinoa, 
brought the Altiplano campesinos into the global agri-food system and consolidated the 
south-north supply chain (70). At the same time, a new “green market” was growing rapidly 
in the North. Demand for organic products in the US grew 14 percent from 1988 to 1992 
(Thrupp 1995, 123). Quinoa farmers were well positioned to grow with this new market. 
Organic production often takes specialized knowledge, which indigenous populations tend to 
possess. Peasants had the added benefit of already having formed peasant organizations a 
decade earlier, making it easy for importers to obtain the product from one source. As a 
result, the growth of the quinoa economy grew hand-in-hand with the growth of the non-
traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) and in doing so, placed new demands on peasants.  
From 1985 to 1990 quinoa was primarily distributed by health food and fair trade 
businesses. While breaking out of rural markets into an export-orientated agriculture 
generated better prices (Cáceres et al. 2007, 184) international demand created higher 
standards for product quality and homogenization; the inconsistency in product quality 
threatened the private quinoa distributors business (Salcedo 2015, 327). An application of 
industrial standards had to be applied to ensure the small-scale farmers could comply with 
international organic standards. With the support from the Association of Organizations of 
Ecological Producers (AOPEB) the certification company Bolicert was created. In 1992 
ANAPQUI began a training program to teach farmers the technical aspects of organic 
production to comply with the requirements of northern buyers. Four years later CECAOT 
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followed ANAPQUI’s model and converted to organic production. As Laguna notes, “this 
collective action of the peasant organizations meant that they were the first Bolivian actors to 
make a foray into the production and commercialization of organic quinoa and promoting the 
expansion of their exports” (Laguna 2006, 70). For POs to certify their product Bolicert 
requires the whole of the production of its farmer associations meet organic requirements. 
(Laguna 2003, 16).   
The requirement to meet organic certifications changed the relationship between 
producers and buyers whereby buyers became “lead firms” (Humphrey & Schmitz 2001). 
Central to value chain analysis is the concept of governance; and governance is defined by 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (2001) as, “non-market coordination of economic activity.” 
Furthermore, Humphrey & Schmitz (2001) make the connection between how the question 
of governance arises by explaining how some firms in the chain work according to 
parameters set by others, thus defining a ‘lead firm’ (2001, 22). A key contribution to the 
commodity chain literature was the distinction Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) made 
between buyer-driven and producer-driven value supply chains. The Bolivian quinoa 
economy provides an example of the advantages and disadvantages of a buyer-driver model 
on the producers at origin. At the same time, the recent commodification of quinoa represents 
a unique example of what happens when a value chain shifts from producer to buyer-driven. 
The conversion to organic is also what altered the value chain. Market demand 
provides an illustration of the growing importance of an organic product. In 1993, Quinoa 
Corporation began purchasing organic quinoa from ANAPQUI; this partnership represented 
50% of Bolivian quinoa sales (Laguna 2003). As demand for organic quinoa increased, and 
organic non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAE) expanded in general across Latin 
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America, small-scale quinoa producers saw an innovative means to increase the 
socioeconomic benefits through NTAEs. At the same time, the Bolivian quinoa co-operatives 
were focused on improving their ability to mechanize processing. The shift to organic 
production had multiple impacts on the supply chain and co-ops. Through the co-operatives, 
international buyers could influence the growing techniques of members. In order to meet the 
new international demand for the grain, peasants had to convert to organic farming methods 
with the expense subsidized by ANAPQUI.11 ANAPQUI informed the members what 
standards they needed to comply with to meet buyers’ demands. In order to achieve organic 
quality for quinoa “Real Blanca,” the Quinoa Natural Production Program (PROQUINAT) 
initiated a reorganization of planting areas through a new production system and certification 
standards. This initiative was in direct response to global demand—a new pattern of “buyer-
driven governance” for quinoa had been established (Cáceres et al. 2007, 185). 
 
3.6 The Entrance of Private Firms  
An unintended side effect of growth in the Bolivian quinoa trade was the entrance of 
new actors that saw potential benefit from the growing export business. The buyer-driven 
model influenced development efforts by shifting upgrade investments away from peasant 
organizations. As mentioned in chapter two, the Bolivian government and NGOs played an 
initial role in the creation of new actors in the supply chain. The results of a supply chain 
mapping study commissioned by SBPC determined POs to have limited time to react to 
changing buyer demands and to meet customer quality requirements. SBPC tried to position 
newly created private export firms as dynamic actors in chain development. The approach 																																																								11	The	excessive	overhead	of	certified	organic	quinoa	paid	by	ANAPQUI	compared	with	the	real	sales	has	contributed	to	an	increasing	debt	to	ANAPQUI	(Laguna	2003,	38).		
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taken to supply chain development was biased on segmentation of the chain thus increasing 
vertical integration (Ton & Bijman, 2006, 9-10). Most POs were vertically integrated into 
processing and they therefore competed with private firms (Ton & Bijman, 2006, 12). While 
government agencies and private firms thought of POs as producers, POs derived their 
legitimacy by pooling collective efforts to gain control over links (e.g., processing) in the 
value chain.   
 Private quinoa companies began to form as early as 1987. The first new quinoa firms 
were French retailers. For example, Jatary was founded on the vertical integration model as a 
local processing subsidiary with funding from Euronat, the importer, and Carrefour, a 
multinational retailer as the main buyer (Raynolds 2007). “Quality problems” were the 
reasons alleged for the creation of Jatary (Cáceres et al 2007, 187). As of 2013, there were 62 
processing plants in Bolivia, of those 27% are small-scale semi-industrial, 57% industrial 
quinoa plants in Bolivia, and 16% artisanal (Carimentrand 2015, 332). Figure 2 illustrates the 
competition private firms posed to the POs. Jatary’s vertical integration model was able to 
quickly capture a large market share of ANAPQUI (Appendix A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	50	
Figure 2: Evolution of quinoa exports by producer organizations (ANAPQUI and 
CECAOT) and private firms (Andean Valley, Jatary and Quinoa Bol S.R.L.) between 
1990 -2004. 
Source: (Laguna 2005, as cited in Ton 2006) 
USAID funded export development projects in Bolivia from 1989-1996. One of the 
outcomes was the creation of Fundación Bolinvest, an NGO set up to provide technical 
assistance and market information to producers in order to expand Bolivia’s non-traditional 
exports (CARANA Corporation). Bolinvest connected Quinoa Corporation to the private 
company Andean Valley. This private business went into direct competition with the Peasant 
Organizations. To compete with the private enterprises the associations of producers, 
CECAOT and ANAPQUI had to pay less to the producer. Price comparisons between 2003 
and 2004 of peasant organizations range from $15-$18/qq12 compared to private 
organizations payment of $19.5-$22.7/qq (Laguna 2003, 25). Until the entry of Andean 
Valley, Quinoa Corporation purchased exclusively through ANAPQUI. The entry of this new 
private firm, however, created competition and the peasant organizations lost their 
exclusivity contract. Consequently, Quinoa Corporation demanded a higher quality product 
at a less per ton cost (Laguna 2006, 71). On the other hand, CECAOT had a different 
relationship with its buyer. It was not informed who the importers were; the relationship 
followed a “broker” model. As a consequence CECAOT received the lowest price compared 
to other peasant organizations and private firms operating under the vertical integration 
model. In the last decade, the quinoa supply has diversified in terms of both varieties and 
products available. In addition to basic pearl quinoa, there are a wide variety of quinoa-based 
products such as biscuits, healthy snacks, noodles, and beverages (Carimentrand et al 2015, 
330). New players took over roles traditionally filled by the original producer cooperatives 																																																								12	Bolivian	quinoa	is	weighed	in	quintal	(qq).	One	quintal	is	equivalent	to	1	British	pound	or	46.8	kiligrams	
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or, in some cases created new value-added activities higher in the chain enabling for higher 
financial gains in comparison to the peasant producer organizations (Appendix B). 
 
3.7 A Divided Countryside: Contract Farming  
Laguna, Cáceres, and Carimentrand (2006) state that the shift to a buyer-driven 
commodity chain caused contract farming. An abundance of literature exists on the negative 
impact on the environment due to a dramatic increase in quinoa production and the change in 
farming methods (Jacobsen 2011, Biodiversity International 2007). However, there is a lack 
of literature written on the division of labor. Two consequences of the new quinoa economy 
were the entrance of private firms that created a contract farming model, and a deepening of 
the divide between subsistence farmers (small holder farmers) and farmers who could afford 
to mechanize, thus taking controlling larger plots of land.  
Private firms imposed requirements on farmers including: duration of the agreement, 
price which is normally set at Challapata as well as various requirements on organic 
certification and quality (Cáceres et al 2007, 186). Under this structure the private companies 
upstream in the quinoa chain “consolidated the ‘contract model’ between individual peasant 
producers and agro-industrial companies, establishing a division of labor whereby peasants 
were limited to their agricultural function and subject to ‘selection’ according to quality 
requirements” (Ibid). Under the contract model farmers have little bargaining power. The 
terms of the agreement are set out under the contract and do not offer the possibility of 
earning additional funds through upgrading activities.  
Published research provides broad statistics on the price of quinoa and tons exported, 
but provides little information on the price paid per producer. In 2012 the value of quinoa 
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exports was $80 million. In 2002 the value was $2 million; in less than ten years export value 
grew 40 times (IBCE 2013). According to a more recent study by Gandarillas et al. (2015) 
“between 2000-2013 production and exports grew from 1,000 to 40,000 tons and from USD 
1.164 million to USD 140 million; annual income has increased from less than USD $1,000 
to USD $15,000” (344). The most important boom was between 2007-2009 when the price 
rose 131%. After 2009 there was a period of stable prices that lasted for 4 years. Between 
May 2013 and January 2014 the FOB13 doubled again. By January the average price set a 
record level at $7,443 per ton. The FAO announced 2013 as the International Year of Quinoa 
which led to speculative practices by producers (239). This caused cultivated surface areas to 
increase from 50,000 to 120,000 hectares with production value from 28,000 to 60,000 tons, 
and exports from $12 million to $100 million. Bolivia exported 6,000 tons more quinoa in 
2013 versus 2012. According to research by Vasquez, “unlike other crops in Bolivia much of 
the profits (an estimated 60-70%) generated by quinoa exports goes directly to farmers. In 
2013, this amounted to > USD 100 million” (Ibid).  
 
																																																								13	Freight	on	Board	
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Figure 3: Income for Bolivian Quinoa Producers 
Source Gandarillas et al. 2015 
In a 2003 study by Laguna, he conducted research on the price paid to farmers based 
on growing organic versus conventional quinoa. The highest costs in processing are the cost 
of tractors and hired labor force for thrashing (Laguna 2003, 52). In the Southern Altiplano 
the cropping system has two types of quinoa production: the quinoa mono-cropping system 
with medium capital intensity and the lowest labor intensity, and cultivation on the mountain 
slopes with a high labor intensity (48). In Laguna’s study (2003), on the feasibility of fair 
trade for quinoa he mentions wages paid to day laborers, “their domestic labor was poorly 
rewarded, close to $3USD/day and similar to wages obtained selling labor through 
migration” (52). His 2003 research showed that when prices drop, conventional quinoa 
growers in the Altiplano earn less working per day ($3USD/day) compared to what they paid 
to hired labor ($3.2USD/day) or what they would obtain working outside the region 
($3.5USD/day) (Laguna 2003, 62). Furthermore, when quinoa prices fall farmers are forced 
to migrate. Chapter 4 elaborates on migration patterns in the Altiplano.  
Small individual producers dominate primary quinoa production. They have no basic 
infrastructure for processing or storing the product and are the weakest link in the chain 
(Salcedo 2015, 327). Risi et al. (2015) posit the reason why it is difficult to obtain figures on 
quinoa laborers is because the continuous price fluctuation of quinoa makes it very difficult 
to estimate the number of farmers who are dedicated to production. There are no detailed 
records or new estimates. According to Risi et al. (2015) there are 14,426 families registered 
as quinoa producers in 351 communities across the Altiplano (47). Given the lack of 
economic opportunity in the region, many farmers who abandoned their fields to settle in the 
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cities are now returning to grow quinoa (Risi et al. 2015, 104). Widely believed estimates list 
70,000 production units were dedicated to quinoa cultivation in 2001; of these 55,000 were 
occasional producers and after 2000 were dedicated to producing for the market (Risi et al. 
2015, 104). Furthermore there are differences between large and small producers according 
to economic resources they manage, and wage relations appear in the supply chain from 
operators of machinery to day laborers (22). Most of the major current producers are those 
who have been able to buy or hire machinery to remove and sow. According to the system of 
ayllu farmers can claim the land by farming on it. Therefore access land is determined by the 
economic ability to clear land via tractor. The result has been wealthier landowners renting 
land to small producers or directly to the communities. In many cases, the resources required 
for this development have been obtained through the non-farm businesses that these 
producers have in the cities where they live part of the time. In fact, many of the new 
producers are people who have returned to their communities thanks to the rise in quinoa 
prices, and they invest some capital obtained through work in the cities (Risi et al. 2015, 
106).  Risi et al. state it is a fact that the production of quinoa in the highlands is growing on 
the basis of an expansion of cultivated area, and not on the basis of the use of better 
technologies. In this way, the progressive mechanization of farming has led to the emergence 
and strengthening of a new category of producer, the "driver", that is, the “farmer” that has 
purchased one or more tractors and with them, have been able to "expand their fields in the 
grazing lands" (Ibid). Many day laborers arrive in large numbers during the harvest from 
nearby cities to plant and later harvest quinoa. During the boom years the demand for labor 
skyrocketed. The wage paid to farm labor was more than the wage paid to a construction 
worker (Risi et al. 2015, 107).   
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Quinoa production is fundamental for communities in the Altiplano. Close to 80% of 
the 70 thousand peasant units that produce quinoa are small-scale farmers, many of them 
subsistence farmers. To process quinoa for a household, the production cost of quinoa is 
relatively low because much of the labor is assumed by the family. However, with the 
increased price of quinoa much of this has changed (Risi et al. 2015, 95). In this area families 
tend to grow quinoa in plots between 4 to 8 hectares and between 2 to 12 ecotypes of quinoa. 
63% to 92% of quinoa production is intended for sale while between 7% to 31% is intended 
to barter and 1 to 14% is cultivated for consumption (Ibid). Risi et al.’s research (2015) on 
quinoa “clusters”14 analyzes the links of the value chain: primary production, processing and 
marketing as well as the main channels and links between them (22). Figure 4 illustrates the 
stakeholders in the “Quinoa Real” value chain (southern Altiplano of Bolivia).  
 
 
																																																								14	Clusters	are	translated	as	groups	of	quinoa	growing	area	
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Figure 4: Economic Actors in the “Quinoa Real” value chain (southern Altiplano of 
Bolivia) 
Source: Gout et al. 2013 from Soraide as sited in Carimentrand 2015 
 
3.8 Fair Trade’s Supply Chain 
 The quinoa trade began in the Altiplano with the contracts between OECAs and 
European importers selling quinoa in world shops. This was prior to Fairtrade certification. 
According to Carimentrand (2015), “In the early days, fair trade focused on promoting the 
organization of producers; in other words, producer organizations handled the collection, 
washing and hulling of the quinoa, and they were in direct contact with import businesses. 
The producers played a major role in adding value to the final product through their 
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organizations, and had significant control over the production chain” (339). As explained in 
the previous section exports from POs have lost some ground on exports by private firms. 
POs under the Fairtrade label are loosing ground to fair trade exports by private firms 
because updated fair trade standards now allow certification on contract farming. (Gout et al. 
as sited in Carimentrand 2015, 339).      
Alter Eco was one of the first quinoa retailers. It sources quinoa from ANAPQUI. 
According to Alter Eco its partnership approach offers a long-term partnership, pays a fair 
trade premium to support sustainable initiatives and improves professionalism. Alter Eco 
offers one third more revenue for farmers and their community versus other buyers. In 
addition to paying the average Challapata market price it also pays for the following: organic 
premium, Alter Eco premium, Fairtrade premium, interest financing, and development 
programs (Alter Eco). ANAPQUI is both a quinoa processor and an exporter. Because it 
invested in the upstream market chain, the cooperative obtains a larger percentage of 
revenue. However, as shown in figure 5 distributors and retailers obtain the largest 
percentage of revenue.  
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Figure 5: Quinoa Cost Breakdown: Fair Trade Quinoa vs. Conventional  
Source: Alter Eco 
When the price of quinoa is high, there is little incentive for POs to sell to fair trade 
partners. Not all POs are willing to be burdened to comply with Fairtrade and organic 
standards. In general there is a lack of research on the impact of fair trade to quinoa 
farmers.15 One critique is that the demand for Fairtrade quinoa is not large enough to support 
a one-buyer model. Oftentimes, POs sell Fairtrade certified quinoa to a non-fair trade 
buyer.16 The Fairtrade price was not an incentive to POs to sell through fair trade channels 																																																								15	In	a	conversation	with	the	the	Quinoa	Supply	Chain	Specialist	at	Fair	Trade	USA	the	current	industry	concern	is	the	lack	of	fair	trade	quinoa	supply.		16	Farmers	are	not	honoring	their	contracts	and	instead	are	selling	their	crop	to	the	non-fair	trade	market.	Furthermore,	the	Fairtrade	industry	lacks	sufficient	evidence	to	support	its	claim	to	alleviate	poverty	among	quinoa	farmers.			
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when the price of quinoa was high during the boom years. In fact, 2015 was the first year the 
price of Fairtrade quinoa surpassed conventional or organic quinoa (Stenn 2015, 2). I have 
yet to find a study on premium investments to be able to draw any conclusions. Now that the 
boom is over I suspect fair trade could begin to play a more prominent and important role in 
the Altiplano, but only time will tell. To understand the unintended consequences of fair 
trade on quinoa we can draw upon other studies on indigenous populations entering the 
global economy through fair trade (Raynolds et al. 2004, Arce 2009) that suggest harmful 
impacts of international market participation within communities and households including: 
increasing debt burdens, insufficient compensation, the potential for growing inequality, and 
lack of cooperative members participation in the fair trade movement’s agenda setting (Lyon 
2007).  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
It should be noted that a discussion on gender relations is absent from this thesis. 
Bolivian females are historically marginalized and violence against women is not 
uncommon. Furthermore, women are important contributors to the household through their 
participation in quinoa production in addition to seeing to other household responsibilities 
such as daily chores, cooking and childcare. Incorporating gender relations in the quinoa 
economy is an important area for future research. Stenn (2015) notes in her current research 
how women have desires to work beyond the field and have ideas of working together on 
quinoa processing projects (9). Overall, there is little research on the impact of the quinoa 
boom on female Bolivian farmers including on the women who are left behind in the city 
while the men return to the countryside to labor in the quinoa harvest. Professor Tamara 
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Stenn, under a Fullbright scholarship grant, is studying, “how does quinoa production affect 
sustainability and the well-being of Andean women” (3). Her research should provide insight 
into two missing areas of research: the impact of the boom on female campesinas, and the 
impact of Fairtrade on the communities in the Altiplano.   
This chapter tracked the unintended consequences of a growing quinoa value chain 
first by explaining the implications attached to the shift to a buyer-driven chain, the role 
development agencies played in the entrance of new players, and the resulting decrease in 
profits paid to peasants. Quinoa’s transformation into a global commodity serves as an 
important example of the impact on peasant producers when a local food staple is used as a 
vehicle for economic development. The supply chain began as a direct trade model between 
peasant organizations and importers. The international popularity created a more complex 
supply chain with added quinoa farmers, wage laborers, competing lead-firms, private 
business processors and exporters. This shift to a buyer-driven value chain model created 
unintended consequences for the producers as they have lost market share to private 
businesses and have been relegated back to the role of laborer under a contract-farming 
model. This grassroots project to secure a new quinoa buyer was successful in part because 
neoliberal economic policy fostered NTAE products. For the farmers, the unintended 
consequences of entering into the global economy was a social divide between peasant 
farmers (those who have the means to own a tractor and those who do not) and less control 
over how to produce their crop and who to sell it too. In effect, neoliberalism created an entry 
point for a new quinoa economy and absorbed the local economy into the global.    
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 
 
Here begins a new Bolivia. Here we begin to reach a true equality. I want you to know 
something, the colonial state ends here. Sisters and brothers, neoliberalism ends here too.” 
-President Evo Morales, Jan 2009, After the Official Passage of the Constitution		
 
 
Historically, the Andes it is a site of Indian rebellions against the state. The state-peasant 
relationship is a central theme in agrarian studies (Edelman and Borras 2016, location 2735). 
At the turn of the millennium, social movements used their strength to elect a president 
opposed to neoliberal policies. Neoliberal policies that focus on export-led growth opened 
new trade relations for agricultural products that as was shown in the previous chapter, was 
positive for some and negative for others. For decades, these producers were searching for 
ways to process their crop and sell it to buyers other than an intermediary. The same export 
policies also caused a major backlash against neoliberalism. This backlash was so great that 
for the first time social movements were willing to merge to fight for the same cause. In turn, 
neoliberal policies promoting export growth in the agrarian sector had an unintended impact 
on the political identity of campesinos and consequently on national politics. The Bolivian 
political structure that had for centuries repressed indigenous peoples ended up opening the 
door for new ways of organizing to elect indigenous leadership. Indigeneity played a large 
role in mobilizing support against neoliberalism. Indigenous movements against 
globalization and neoliberalism, through transnational agrarian movements, remain an active 
part of development projects in the Andes. In order to have a complete analysis of the 
Bolivian quinoa economy it is necessary to assess the ongoing impact of neoliberalism in the 
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Andes. This chapter explores the Bolivian quinoa economy as a case study of the unintended 
consequences of neoliberalism on quinoa producers. I give the farmers agency by postulating 
that peasants used neoliberalism as a movement to their advantage despite the fact that this 
was not the intention of neoliberalism. This chapter shows how politics remains at the heart 
of the quinoa story. This chapter provides a historical perspective on how peasants have 
changed national policies to their advantage. In addition, this chapter explores the following: 
1) the progression of Indian rebellions, 2) how the backlash of neoliberalism opened the door 
for new identities to emerge among indigenous peoples 3) indigenous politics in relation to 
food sovereignty.  
 
4.1 The Progression of Indian Rebellions 
In analyzing the Bolivian quinoa economy, one cannot ignore the political and 
geographical context of quinoa production because of the paradox it poses, pro-indigenous 
campesinos once protesters of the free market and neoliberal policies are now actors in it. 
The Bolivian quinoa economy is centered in a region whose inhabitants have a deep history 
of exploitation for their labor and natural resources. This exploitation primarily results from 
centuries of colonial and post-colonial discrimination of indigenous peoples that has 
marginalized them agriculturally and subjugated them in wage labor in mines. As previously 
mentioned Bolivians live in harsh terrain, additionally the country is geographically isolated 
(Bolivia is landlocked) and the Altiplano is particularly remote, located at high altitudes 
between the Andes Mountain range on the west and the fertile plateau on the east. Although 
remote, the region has long been involved in globalization projects through the extraction of 
natural resources and quinoa is no exception.  
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Bolivia has the largest Indian population in South America. There are two indigenous 
groups: Quechua and Aymaran. “Indigenous nationalism” in Bolivia has often meant Aymara 
nationalism. Some intellectuals consider Bolivia as an, “Aymara country that neither the 
Incas nor the Spaniards could defeat” (Lucero 2008, 115). Aymara people resisted the 
Quechua imposition of the Inca empire and the most recent efforts of the Bolivian state 
(Lucero 2008, 81). Because of the history of exploitation, the people of the Altiplano also 
have a long-standing record of revolt against the government in their struggles for higher 
wages and working conditions, rights as citizens, rights to their land and to their right to 
maintain a dignified livelihood. The pinnacle of the success of these movements was the 
election of Evo Morales—a cocalero (coca farmer)—to the presidency in 2005. The 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, with Morales as the leader, was elected to power as 
a direct result of the political backing of indigenous peasant movements that emerged in 
opposition to economic policies largely focused on export-led growth (Dangl 2007). 
 
4.1.2 19th Century Migration  
For the native population, the nineteenth century was marked by a period of forced 
migration. Prior to the invasion of the Spanish in the Americas, the native population of 
Quechua and Aymaran Indians in Bolivia were peasants or merchants living under an Incan 
system of ayllus (kinship-based organizations). Given the harsh terrain of the Andes, small 
plots of land, each planted with a different crop, helped to ensure that a diverse array of crops 
were available. The communities moved between the zones exchanging products as a means 
of communal survival. Under the colonial system of haciendas, the Spanish manipulated the 
cooperative nature of the farms. Hacienda owners took land away from the native population 
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and forced the native communities to become dependent serf-tenants or seasonal low 
wageworkers. Typically, settlement patterns were orientated toward the mines and organized 
by the political economy of specific commodities with each lower level supplying for the 
level above it (Wolf 2010, 145). When the Spanish found silver in 1545 in Potosí, the first 
massive migration to the mines began. The Spaniards also manipulated an obligatory labor 
draft system (mita) that existed in Inca times by extending the system to the mines.   
The mining economy and the activities that supported it were the center of order with 
the Indian communities serving as reservoirs of labor and sources of cheap labor for 
agricultural products. Indian communities occupied the lowest rung of society (Wolf 2010, 
149). After centuries of living under colonial rule and the mita system, the rebellion of 1809 
in Upper Peru (present day Bolivia) marked the start of the wars for independence in Latin 
America. In 1826, Simón Bolívar Palacio created Bolivia’s first constitution. The post-
independence era began with decrees calling for distribution of land to landless Indians, 
equality for all, and the end of compulsory labor. Throughout the 19th century the Indians had 
a reciprocal relationship with the state, paying tribute and providing services to the state in 
exchange for protection of land (Langer 2009, 539). Indians were seen as integral to the 
foundation of the state since it relied on the tribute for survival. While accepted as 
community members, Indians were not considered on the same level as whites or mestizos. 
Indians were characterized by ethnic terms as indígena, singling them out from the ruling 
class (Ibid). In 1860, the economic situation of the Andean communities changed. Taking 
power through a military coup, Mariano Melgarejo directly attacked the Andean community 
through land legislation that claimed state’s rights over community lands. The assaults on 
their collective landholdings left the Indian communities in despair. By the late nineteenth 
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century, the Indian communities of the Altiplano had been pauperized and most had to give 
up their wide-ranging merchant activities. The state marginalized indigenous peoples in other 
ways as well; the abolition of tribute that became effective at the national level in 1881 meant 
that the mutual dependence between indigenous authorities and state officials declined. 
Whatever commitment the state had made towards protecting the communities and their land 
base had evaporated. A new ideology brought from Europe that denigrated the Indians and 
proclaimed them racially inferior became popular among the ruling classes of Bolivia 
(Langer 2009, 548). 
 
4.1.3 The Fight Against Exploitation: The 1952 Revolution  
 Since its independence Bolivia has had one the least stable political histories in Latin 
America with coups interrupting brief periods of elected civilian rule. Much of the violence 
centered on the control of natural resources that are Bolivia’s top exports. Civilian dissident 
groups began to organize themselves into powerful national opposition parties in the 1940s. 
The two most important of these were the middle-class, and initially fascist-oriented 
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; MNR), and 
the Marxist and largely pro-Soviet Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda 
Revolucionaria; PIR). The mining unions were at the forefront of the revolution, fighting for 
the nationalization of the mines, greater social justice, and land distribution. Throughout this 
decade, miners together with rural peasant farmers, campesinos, coordinated national strikes 
and protests demanding access to education, land, and better salaries and working conditions. 
These protesters united their demands under the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) 
party. In 1951 the MNR candidate, Victor Paz Estenssoro, won a clear victory. However, the 
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army intervened, instead placing General Hugo Balivian in power. The MNR took the 
presidency back by force in the event that is referred to as The Revolution of 1952 (Preston 
1969, 2). The mineworkers and peasants led the revolt and they experienced the most 
benefits (Ibid). Indians did gain significant rights from the revolution: the right to vote and 
extensive land reform that granted Indians land and ended the feudal hacienda system. In 
exchange, Indians served as the dependable anchor of the MNR party and a succession of 
military governments until the mid-1970s (Van Cott 2003,760). The year 1952 is also 
significant because it marked the time when the farming peasantry became politically active. 
In fact, a key factor in the passing of agrarian reform was the sindicatos or peasant unions. 
Communal organization increased since the revolution, and peasant unions as well as local 
community organizations formed throughout the Andes. The peasant unions were used to 
direct the actions of the peasant as one national network. They acted on behalf of the 
community to press for the speedy expropriation of their property and collectively voice the 
peasants’ opinions (Preston 1969, 2). 
 
4.1.4 Indians as Second-Class Citizens: the 1950s-70s 
The MNR party may have had the support of the indigenous groups but they did not 
have the group’s interest in mind. They used the peasant masses to further the political 
interests of the party. The situation for peasants worsened when the MNR gave the military 
full control of the countryside. Throughout the 70s, 80s and 90s the economic perils of 
Bolivia caused migrations of miners and farmers searching for new forms of work to sustain 
them. This migration would lead to the further development of social movements and the 
fight for peasant rights. Despite these policies, public support for the dictatorship was high 
until the “Massacre of Tolata.” Once again, the peasant union organized against government 
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policy. Private property, a market economy, and a mestizo and citizen identity were the solid 
grievances upon which peasant organization took shape (Kohl and Farthing 2011, 95).	At the 
massacre, more than 100 peasants, protesting against price increases, were killed or wounded 
when the government ordered in troops and the situation became violent. The massacre 
served as a turning point by consolidated the emerging indigenous movement in the 
highlands and paved the way for larger scale Indian organizations to expand. This was 
especially the case for the Aymara Katarista movement, which played a major role in the 
backlash against neoliberalism. The Katarismo marked a critical break from the government-
sponsored unions linked to the 1952 revolution. For the first time in 400 years Katerismo 
promoted an indigenous nationalism that merged class-consciousness with indigenous 
demands (Ibid). 
 
4.2 The Fight Against Globalization: The Rise of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) 
As the 90s progressed, dissatisfaction with traditional political leaders and traditional 
political parties became more widespread. The effects of neoliberalism and the continued 
discrimination by race and class created ever-stronger calls for equality. Set against the 
backdrop of corruption and questioning the level of democracy in Bolivia, social 
organizations were looking for a new political structure that would respond to their demands 
while allowing for and encourage their political participation (Vandem 2007, 21). Amid this 
political setting in 1995 the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) was born in the coca-
growing region of Chapare. MAS developed out of the necessity to form a political 
instrument in order to change the policies that were destroying rural livelihoods (Dangl 2007, 
48). The U.S. backed plan to sell Bolivia’s natural gas to the U.S. through a port in Chile lead 
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to the Gas Wars of 2003. Bolivians across class lines united against the export plan and 
mobilized several social movements to fight as one directly against globalization. It was clear 
that this trade deal would once again have negative impacts on the indigenous people leaving 
them deeper in poverty and at the mercy of outside economic forces. The Gas Wars brought 
an abrupt end to Sánchez de Lozada’s presidency, culminating with his flight from the 
country and soon after the departure of his Vice President Carlos Mesa. In the past, peasant 
uprisings and mine strikes were local in nature and did not link to national movements or 
international circumstances (Vandem 2007, 23). After the president fled the country, Vice 
President Carlos Mesa took over the administration for a brief period prior to elections. His 
administration was plagued with protests against globalization and the privatization of water, 
gas, oil and basic amenities. In 2005, Evo Morales won a landslide victory to become 
Bolivia’s first indigenous president. He campaigned on the platform to nationalize gas 
reserves, ally with coca farmers, redistribute land to poor farmers, reject U.S.-backed free 
trade policies, and bring about an end to neoliberalism (Dangl 2007, 199-200). The 
indigenous class had used their political rights to elect a president from their party. They 
would soon gain more civil rights, and for the first time social rights as citizens. This 
launched a new era in Bolivian politics, led by MAS and was closely linked to emergent 
indigenous, anti-colonial, and populist social movements that had come together in 
opposition to the neoliberal reforms. This coalition was called Pacto de Unidada (Unity Pact) 
and became integrated into the new regime (Ben McKay et al. 2014,1190).  
 
4.3 Neoliberalism and New Identities – The Neoliberal Indian Paradox 
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The growth of the quinoa economy coincides with the growth of Transnational 
agrarian movements (TAMs). As defined by Edelman and Borras (2016) TAMs are 
organizations, networks, coalitions and solidarity linkages of farmers, peasants and their 
allies that cross national boundaries and that seek to influence national and global policies 
(location 341). When we consider the massive protests aimed directly in opposition to the 
export of natural resources, primarily to the USA, it seems ironic that campesinos would 
support the export of their food to the North. Jose Antonio Lucero in his book The Politics of 
Indigenous Representation in the Andes (2008), “sheds light on the highs and lows of 
indigenous movement politics by examining how these movements come together culturally 
and politically, and how they come apart” (vii). Lucero positions himself to be able to call 
out paradoxes in the social movements that are also seen in the quinoa economy. 
Specifically, the author calls attention to, “the surprising compatibility of neoliberalism and 
multiculturalism” (Lucero 2008, 122). Furthermore, he offers the explanation that it is, “no 
surprise that the responses of indigenous people to neoliberal projects have been complex 
and varied” (Ibid). The Bolivian example is the opposite reaction indigenous populations had 
to the export of natural resources compared to the export of quinoa. The former brought 
about social unrest and the rise of a new political party, as discussed above, while the latter 
was largely embraced. It seems contradictory for campesinos to have protested the export of 
natural resources and yet support the export of their resource, quinoa. In this case, it is 
helpful to think of indigenous movements mobilizing in search of greater autonomy and 
recognition (Van Cott 2005 as sited in Lucero 2008). Thinking of social movements under 
this purview we begin to disentangle the contradiction between campesinos acting in 
accordance with a neoliberal export-led economy. By reframing the story, we give agency to 
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the campesinos who, through their collective action, gained greater autonomy and 
recognition through the success of the worldwide consumption of their native food.  
 
4.4 The Promotion of Indigenous Rights by NGOs 
During the 80s in Bolivia campesinos regained their right to organize. As the 
government transitioned out of a dictatorship and into democracy decentralization occurred. 
Campesinos gained more autonomy and funding to support their social program, quinoa 
cooperatives. Peasant movements seized power by embracing their indigeneity. Political 
schisms remained among highland organizations. The highland organization, the 
Confederation of Ayllus, and Markas of Qollasuyo (CONAMAQ) had challenged the 
highland movement Unified Confederation of Bolivian Rural Workers’ (CSUTCB) role in 
the highlands. “Ayllu Federations emphasize the use of traditional community (rotating) 
leadership and reject the Western union models that characterize most highland organizations 
like the CSUTCB” (Lucero 2008, 12). As you will recall from the previous chapter, quinoa 
peasants organized ANAPQUI and CECAOT as cooperatives with elected leaders, in line 
with the ayllu system.   
Transnational agrarian movements and the coalitions they formed with advocacy or 
donor non-governmental organizations is well documented (Edelman et al. 2014, 914). The 
common thread is the role NGOs have played in helping to shape or influence new peasant 
identities. During the 1980s, when global neoliberalism went on the offensive, “privatization 
in the aid complex meant the ‘NGO-ization’ of much of the aid sector” (Edelman and Barros 
2016, location 2549). In the 1990s, multiple constitutions throughout the region ratified the 
International Labor Organization Convention that recognized the collective rights of 
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indigenous people (Lucero 2008,130). NGOs played a role in both encouraging these policy 
reforms and educating the indigenous people about their rights to participate in elections and 
development projects (Ibid). International development agencies were quick to seize upon the 
emergence of TAMs as an opportunity for partnerships. As Edelman and Borras (2016) 
write, “the relatively new modality of development practice emphasizes collaborative 
relationships between international governance institutions and corporate and/or civic society 
entities” (location 2765). In Bolivia, development programs had an influence on social 
movements. The quinoa economy grew in parallel with national and international movements 
promoting the rights of indigenous people. There was a close relationship between 
development workers in the lowlands who influenced the terminology used to create new 
identities.  Healy notes that they “pushed the generic term ‘indigena’ as a way of constructing 
a new identity, to support modern and political developmental activism, and to rally 
dispersed ethnic minorities toward a common cause” (Healy 2001, 79). The new structure 
was important because it focused land rights not on the factor of production but rather on a 
territory, a unit of political and cultural life. Lowland organizations sought to connect with 
other organizations within Bolivia. For the highland populations, according to Healy (2001), 
“the concept of land as territory invigorated the highland-led indigenous social movements 
with an environmental agenda that would help create their modern political identity for 
making demands on the Bolivian state (81). Over the course of 60 years, from the revolution 
to the new constitution, the Indians redefined their identity to fight against the lines that 
define boundaries of inclusion versus exclusion—class, gender, and race—for full 
inclusionary rights as citizens (Kivisto and Faist 2009,17). Embracing their indigenous roots 
allowed the former class-based social movements to shift to a cultural identity-based 
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approach. This approach allowed indigenous groups to democratically overthrow the 
traditional repressive government.  
 
4.5 Politicizing Food: The Creation of Food Sovereignty   
I argue the Bolivian quinoa economy is a case study of how peasants successfully 
embraced their indigenous knowledge (on quinoa cultivation) and used this knowledge as a 
tool to resist neoliberalism in the countryside. Edelman and Borras (2016) point to the 
significant rise in peasant and farmer movements in the late twentieth century as an 
“incompleteness of the transition to capitalism in agriculture” (location 386). Peasant groups 
have organized worldwide against the international classification of the right to access food 
through the conceptual lens known as food security. Instead, Bolivian indigenous farmers 
were successful at incorporating the core tenants of the international food sovereignty 
movement into the constitution. Food security is defined by the FAO as:  
Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. (FAO 2001 cited in 
FAO 2003).  
 
According to Patel (2009), central to what is implied in this definition is the terms of 
which food either is, or is not, made available to the international community; agency is no 
longer under the control of institutions that may have had a vested concern for ‘food security’ 
but rather given over to the market (664). For proponents of food sovereignty hunger, by way 
of having access to food or not, is seen as a political issue. It believes the structures that 
control the movement of food between the North and South severely impact the type and 
amount of food present in a society. To understand the historical context in which food 
sovereignty sprang from we will use the concept of food regimes. Harriet Friedmann and 
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Philip McMichael created the term food regime in 1989 “as a means of linking periods of 
capitalistic accumulation to the international relations of food production and consumption 
that accompany them” (Fairbain 2010, 16). The postwar food regime from 1947-1973 was 
marked by a market intervention, U.S. hegemony, western-oriented development projects, 
and the cold war. It is during this time that the concept of food security emerged. In the 
1980s there was a shift back to free market ideology, nation-states began to lose political 
centrality, and neoliberal ideology peaked (Fairbain 2010, 29). These conditions allowed 
agrifood corporations to expand. This follows what was discussed in chapter 2, the US 
financed agricultural development projects focused on spreading industrial farming methods 
until the 1980s and the shift to free market economics.  
The origins of food sovereignty are debated and veiled in myth (Edelman et al. 2014). 
According to La Via Campesina, they first articulated the terms using it as a response to the 
lack of satisfaction with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
programs (Desmarais 2007,103). Campesinos had heard NGOs speak “on their behalf,” only 
to hear messages misrepresentative of the peasants’ actual motives” (Ibid). According to 
McMichael (2010), “In the present conjuncture, while the development industry is refocusing 
on ‘agriculture for development,’ the food sovereignty movement and its allies are reframing 
both ‘development’ and ‘agriculture’ in relation to politicized understanding of 
sustainability” (181). Madeleine Fairbairn states that the most powerful challenge to food 
sovereignty lies precisely in its politicization of food and agriculture. She writes that, “Food 
sovereignty advocates explicitly name the actors within the system who benefit by 
maintaining the food regime status quo. This stands in stark contrast to the food security 
frame, which presents the current agrifood system as the natural outcome of spontaneous 
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market forces” (Fairbairn 2010, 28). Advocates intentionally use highly political language 
with the intent to shed light on the power relations that led to the formation of the neoliberal 
food regime and gives it greater transformative potential than its predecessors. By doing so, it 
situates itself in the political economy of the current world food system (Fairbairn 2010, 30-
31).  
According to Roberts (2013), “food sovereignty comes from the protest of poor 
peasants and farmers who faced bankruptcy as a result of competition with subsidized food 
staples” (92). This concept sought to challenge the consumer-oriented notion of food security 
and instead bring into focus the actual food producers. A key-differentiating factor between 
these two frames is the lack of politicization implicit in each camp. Food security invokes an 
apolitical language thus avoiding placing responsibility to enforce the concept to any state or 
political power. Food sovereignty, on the other hand, was created by and is defined by the 
grassroots movement La Via Campesina (LVC) (Desmarias 2008, 76). Food sovereignty’s 
founding principle is the stance not to subject food to volatile markets and instead, nurture 
the skills and cultural knowledge that small-scale farmers have as the means to mitigate 
poverty. At the center of this concept of food sovereignty is the “right of each country and 
people to have the right and obligation to develop national agriculture and food policies that 
ensure the health and well-being of its populations, cultures and environments” (Ibid). 
Phrased in another way, each person and country should have the choice to determine where 
their food will comes from, who will grow it, and what it will be. McMichael and Schneider 
warn, “when food becomes a market commodity it satisfies monetary demand, rather than 
social need, which can skew agricultural resources” (2011, 127). Now that farmers have the 
option to sell to new buyers at a higher cost than to the local market, the increase in quinoa 
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exports has had the effect of increasing the cost of quinoa at local markets.17 How do we 
rectify this paradox in the quinoa case study?  
 
4.6 Food Sovereignty in Bolivia 
Research on the Bolivian quinoa economy would not be complete without a 
discussion on Bolivian agricultural policy. Land rights and access to basic human rights have 
been a primary focus of the social movements that have influenced the rise of indigenous 
politics. President Evo Morales grew up as a coca farmer experiencing first-hand the 
economic repercussions of U.S. interventions in Bolivia. In both of his campaigns for 
election, Morales ran on the promise the government would recognize the indigenous 
population and provide them with rights as citizens. Upon his second re-election in 2009, the 
government adopted a constitution; at the heart of the constitution is the recognition and 
protection of indigenous people’s rights by way of creating Bolivia as a pluri-national state 
(Romero 2009). In regards to agricultural policy, an issue of great concern to many 
indigenous people, the state adopted a policy of food sovereignty over food security thus 
pledging to favor local food over imports and to support local food production for local 
consumption. The 2009 Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia includes a 
chapter on “Sustainable Integrated Rural Development” emphasizing food sovereignty as 
integral to rural development (McKay et al. 2014, 1190). Even after the new constitution 
passed the MAS government’s Rural Development and Food Sovereignty and Security 
Policy relied on external funding, did not restructure agriculture or governance, nor did it 
transform relations of production (Ibid). This policy is counter to LVC’s belief that, “the 																																																								17	When	visiting	Cochabamba,	Bolivia	in	2014	locals	reported	a	significant	increase	in	the	cost	of	quinoa	at	local	markets.	They	noticed	the	price	increase	beginning	in	2009,	the	same	year	the	quinoa	boom	began.		
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government should introduce policies to restore the economic condition of the small farmers 
by providing fair allocation of these production resources to farmers, recognizing their rights 
as producers of society, and recognizing community rights in managing local resources” (La 
Via Campesina 2005, 31 as sited in McMichael 2010, 171). According to McKay et al. 2014, 
“despite a general commitment to food sovereignty, there has been an inability to enact 
meaningful structural changes that might contribute to food sovereignty on the ground” 
(location 1193). This partially explains why farmers in the Altiplano have not experienced 
structural change to the inequalities in the quinoa economy; there is a lack of will from the 
state. 
 
4.7 Exporting Quinoa, a Contradiction?   
Given how food sovereignty was integrated with rural development programs and the 
quinoa farmers are choosing to produce food for the external marketplace, it appears neither 
the government nor farmers in the Bolivian Altiplano are adhering to the concept of food 
sovereignty. Rachel Soper offers a perspective from the ground providing an alternate 
perspective from the peasants. Soper argues, “the movement holds an ambiguous stance of 
peasant production for export markets and clearly prioritizes local trade” (537). She 
continues, “based on their experiences supplying export commodity chains and selling crops 
in the domestic market through local intermediaries, they (peasants) prefer export markets for 
their comparatively stable prices” (538). Although the price of quinoa has not yet stabilized 
her study compares to other scholars who have found similar trends among small farmers 
engaged in export markets: Fisher and Benson 2006; Walsh-Dilley 2013; Jaffee 2007 (Soper 
2015, 540).    
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In their book, Feeding the Market, South American Farmers, Trade and 
Globalizaion, Hellin and Higman (2003) give voice to the farmers who are often left out of 
the debate on globalization. The authors conclude from their on-the-ground research that 
farmers want to participate in markets, and a return to subsistence farming is not in their 
agenda (vii).18 Their chapter, “Quinoa and Food Security,” “looks to the extent to which 
quinoa can contribute to food security in the Andes and whether its potential can be realized 
through production for export, as a contribution to diets locally and nationally, or both” (90).  
They acknowledge the seemingly inherent contradiction this paper seeks to explore, that 
there is irony in producing a highly nutritious crop for export from a region where under-
nutrition is widespread. These authors posit that perhaps there is no need for contradiction 
and claim, “many development efforts can be seen as twofold: to encourage the national 
consumption of quinoa within Andean countries and to encourage its production for export, 
providing much needed cash income to rural families” (Hellin & Higman 2003, 98). 
I argue this point of view can be strengthened by looking at the quinoa economy 
through the lens of food sovereignty. Hellin and Higman point to political arrangements that 
have a significant impact on the constraining conditions under which farmers are subject. 
Specifically, trade liberalization has reduced the ability of countries to favor food production 
within their own borders. “In South America, this has been blamed for the reduction in 
quinoa production” (Hellin & Higman 2003, 93). As was explained in chapter two, local 
crops could not compete with the local cost of imported wheat from developed countries, 
which contributed to the decline in the local market for quinoa. In Hellin & Higman’s 
conclusion they recognize how the dismantling of protectionism in the developed world lead 																																																								18	This	statement	is	confirmed	by	the	author’s	own	conversation	with	a	quinoa	exporter	from	the	Bolivian	southern	Altiplano.	One	of	the	manager’s	of	the	co-op,	CECAOT,	expressed	his	pride	in	knowing	that	his	crop	is	sold	to	people	in	the	USA.		
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to greater market access for developing countries (213). Without stating as such, Hellin & 
Higman politicize the issue, thus we see how the two views are compatible with the food 
sovereignty movement. Food sovereignty rose as a counter frame to the rejection of the 
corporate food regime. Its advocates target political bodies, not corporations, because they 
believe that this is the level where true change can be made. In fact, what makes this 
movement unique is that it does not seek to create new labels, but rather it offers solutions. 
With the election of Evo Morales peasants did obtain significant political change through 
political action. Quinoa farmers still have not given up the fight to secure what they believe 
to be a “fair buyer.” A socio-political organization Mancomunidad de la Gran Tierra de 
Lipez, and the Consorcio de Lipez spearheaded and were granted a domination of origin 
(DO) for quinua real (Ofstehage 2012, 450). The movement toward differentiation of Lipeña 
quinoa intends to add value to the products, and promote an alternative local economy based 
on recognition of tradition. The DO label certifies the territorial origin of quinoa. The 
consortium will purchase quinoa directly from the local cooperatives, many of them operated 
by women (Ibid). This initiative is representative of the ever-present social and economic 
regional divides that exist in the Altiplano, and most importantly serves as an example of 
peasants reasserting their agency.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The definitions of food security and food sovereignty are fluid. It remains to be seen 
how the transnational agrarian movements will evolve. I turn to Edelman et al. (2014) to 
encapsulate what the quinoa economy is experiencing, that is to say quinoa farmers’ 
“dependence on long-distance trading systems frequently amounts to a double-edge sword 
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for smallholders and farm workers, with especially damaging impacts in the world’s poorest 
countries” (915). When we unearth the challenges embedded in the food sovereignty 
movement the inconsistencies of the export economy become less paradoxical. For this 
reason I argue the importance of recognizing that food sovereignty is not static nor is it only 
focused on pushing an anti-neoliberal agenda. In McMichael’s words, “it is a hybrid, in large 
part because it must simultaneously address immediate needs and posit real alternatives” 
(2010, 172). The immediate need of peasant farmers in the Altiplano is the need for a 
livelihood. The Northern market provided an opportunity for farmers to make a living from 
their land. However, the farmers also are facing new challenges to their success through 
interactions with new actors in what was a previously non-existent Bolivian quinoa economy 
that food sovereignty, as it is evoked in the constitution, has yet to politically address.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The primary objective in writing this thesis was to contribute to the body of literature 
about the effects on Bolivian farmers because of their participation in the global economy. 
My unique contribution is to show quinoa farmers affected the global quinoa economy and at 
the same time demonstrate that their participation in the global exchange of commodities is 
not acting counter to their historical anti-neoliberal stance. I do so by providing a historical 
perspective on the decades long journey quinoa farmers engaged in to obtain new buyers for 
their crop—quinoa—which was purchased in small numbers regionally, yet was the only 
source of local income. This study provides new insight into the evolution of quinoa as a 
development project by explaining how securing external buyers was in fact a grassroots 
endeavor. By giving agency to the farmers this research debunks the media stories that have 
conflated the quinoa boom with malnutrition rates in Bolivia. Instead, it exposes the 
structural inequalities inherent in “development” projects that led to poverty and malnutrition 
rates decades before quinoa was sold outside of Bolivia. This research provides a foundation 
for further exploration into how quinoa farmers could continue to be agents of change for 
their communities. Future research needs to be done on how Fairtrade can offer a stronger 
positive impact on quinoa communities, specifically how to incorporate small-scale famers 
into the new quinoa economy. Lastly, there is room for further research on how quinoa 
farmers are interpreting food sovereignty.  
From this analysis we can draw four main conclusions. First, mainstream media 
articles have distorted the consequences of the quinoa boom on Bolivians. The increase in 
Bolivian quinoa exports is not the cause of high rates of malnutrition among quinoa farmers 
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or the Bolivian population as a whole. High poverty rates and high rates of malnutrition are 
the result of complex structural inequalities. To understand present day issues one must take 
a historical look at the economic policies that contributed to making Bolivian society how it 
is today. The unintended consequence of oversimplifying the experiences of farmers was a 
confused consumer. If consumers had decided not to buy quinoa this would have been a 
negative consequence for farmers, as they would have lost their new buyer. 
Second, selling quinoa outside of the Andes region was not just the idea, but also the 
hope of Bolivian farmers who should be recognized for overcoming a series of challenges to 
secure new buyers. These challenges included cultural prejudice, economic policy limiting 
indigenous crops for export, and various development agendas impeding community-led 
goals. Their success is a case study in the value of community participation to development. 
This case cautions against using market access as a means to poverty alleviation. Fair trade 
has played an important role in introducing quinoa to health food stores and helping farmers 
secure long-term partnerships.  Current Fairtrade standards, including the requirement for 
organic certification, has unintended consequences. The certification scheme is too focused 
on market access as a means to poverty alleviations as such; it is leaving out the most 
vulnerable population fair trade seeks to empower—smallholder farmers.  
Third, to understand who is profiting the most you need to look at the entire value 
chain to see how income is distributed. Due to the fact that producer organizations formed 
early on in the search for new buyers, local farmers have been able to maintain a larger share 
of the profit than in other supply chains. This is because producer organizations not only 
supply raw material, but are also processors and exporters. The unintended consequence of 
the success of the quinoa project is the attraction of more actors, processors and exporters, 
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who producer organizations must compete with. Furthermore, there is an irony in the fact that 
indigenous land rights still exist in the Altiplano. Ancient land rights did not account for the 
invention of mechanized agriculture. The tractor has significantly deepened the divide 
between farmers and created a barrier to entry to the global quinoa market thus forcing 
smallholder farmers into the role of wage laborer.  
Fourth, the quinoa boom has been criticized as a case where food security and food 
sovereignty have been confused. Critics have incorrectly labeled an outcome of the quinoa 
boom as food insecurity whereas a key outcome has been that Bolivians themselves are 
asserting food sovereignty, going as far as to include food sovereignty as a tenant in the 
constitution. However, the food sovereignty movement is not currently responding to how 
farmers should, or should not, interact with global economies. Unfortunately, the inclusion of 
food sovereignty in the constitution has not resulted in a new cultural shift in the quinoa 
economy. The unintended consequence for the adoption of food sovereignty in Bolivia has 
been a lack of political will to include small farmers into the global quinoa economy. 
Finally, with these conclusions in mind, we need to question the ability for quinoa 
exporters to provide a long-term economic solution. The Bolivian government needs to shift 
its focus to a more sustainable approach to extraction. It needs to do so in order to preserve 
the environment, and thus quinoa and should do so if it wants to preserve its good standing 
with the indigenous movements that brought it to power. If history has taught us anything it 
is that Bolivian social movements are very powerful. The Bolivian quinoa economy serves as 
a case study on how community members need to be participants in “development” projects, 
not acted upon. Furthermore, development’s goal of poverty alleviation has led to the 
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creation of projects focusing purely on market access, and these very projects have resulted 
in the unintended consequences of leaving the rural poor out of the global economy.  
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Characteristics	of	Quinoa	Food	Products	Processed	in	the	Andean	Region	
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Street leading to CECAOT, Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia 
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CECAOT Processing Facility, Department of Potosí, Bolivia 
Photo taken by author, February 2014 
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Plowed land in Department of Potosí, Bolivia 
Photo taken by author, February 2014 
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Rows of quinoa, Department of Potosí, Bolivia 
Photo taken by author, February 2014 
 
 
